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[G.R. No. 155207, August 13, 2008]

WILHELMINA S. OROZCO, E!I!IONER, "S. !HE #I#!H $I"ISION O# !HEHONORA%LE CO&R! O# A EALS, HILI INE $AIL' IN(&IRER, AN$ LE!ICIA

)IMENEZ MAGSANOC, RES ON$EN!S.

$ECISION

NACH&RA, ).*

The case before this Court raises a novel question never before decided in our jurisdiction -whether a newspaper columnist is an employee of the newspaper which publishes the column.

In this Petition for Review under Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure! petitioner"ilhelmina #. $ro%co assails the &ecision '() of the Court of *ppeals +C*, in C*- .R. #P o.

/01/ dated 2une ((! 3//3 and its Resolution '3) dated #eptember ((! 3//3 denyin her 5otionfor Reconsideration. The C* reversed and set aside the &ecision '6) of the ational 7aborRelations Commission + 7RC,! which in turn had affirmed the &ecision '4) of the 7abor *rbiter

findin that $ro%co was an employee of private respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer +P&I, andwas ille ally dismissed as columnist of said newspaper.

In 5arch (00/! P&I en a ed the services of petitioner to write a wee8ly column for its 7ifestylesection. #he reli iously submitted her articles every wee8! e9cept for a si9-month stint in ew:or8 City when she! nonetheless! sent several articles throu h mail. #he received compensationof P3 /.// - later increased to P6//.// - for every column published. ' )

$n ovember 1! (003! petitioner;s column appeared in the P&I for the last time. Petitionerclaims that her then editor! 5s. 7ita T. 7o arta! '

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#$ $R&=R=&. '0)

The 7abor *rbiter found that@

'R)espondent company e9ercised full and complete control over the means andmethod by which complainant;s wor8 - that of a re ular columnist - had to beaccomplished. This control mi ht not be found in an instruction! verbal or oral!

iven to complainant definin the means and method she should write hercolumn. Rather! this control is manifested and certained +sic, in respondents;admitted prero ative to reject any article submitted by complainant forpublication.

y virtue of this power! complainant was helplessly constrained to adopt hersubjects and style of writin to suit the editorial taste of her editor. $therwise!off to the trash can went her articles.

5oreover! this control is already manifested in column title! DAeminist

ReflectionD allotted complainant. Ender this title! complainant;s writin wascontrolled and limited to a woman;s perspective on matters of feminineinterests. That respondent had no control over the subject matter written bycomplainant is stron ly belied by this observation. =ven the len th ofcomplainant;s articles were set by respondents.

Inevitably! respondents would have no control over when or where complainantwrote her articles as she was a columnist who could produce an article in thirty+6, +sic, months or three +6, days! dependin on her mood or the amount ofresearch required for an article but her actions were controlled by herobli ation to produce an article a wee8. If complainant did not have to reportfor wor8 ei ht +?, hours a day! si9 +

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The Court does not a ree with public respondent 7RC;s conclusion. Airst!private respondent admitted that she was and 'had) never been considered bypetitioner P&I as its employee. #econd! it is not disputed that privaterespondent had no employment contract with petitioner P&I. In fact! heren a ement to contribute articles for publication was based on a verbala reement between her and the petitioner;s 7ifestyle #ection =ditor. 5oreover!it was evident that private respondent was not required to report to the officeei ht +?, hours a day. Aurther! it is not disputed that she stayed in ew :or8for si9 +

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*s a rule! compliance with the requirements for the perfection of an appealwithin the re lamentary +sic, period is mandatory and jurisdictional. >owever!in ational Aederation of 7abor Enions v. 7adrido as well as in several othercases! this Court rela9ed the requirement of the postin of an appeal bondwithin the re lementary period as a condition for perfectin the appeal. This isin line with the principle that substantial justice is better served by allowin theappeal to be resolved on the merits rather than dismissin it based on atechnicality.

The jud ment of the 7abor *rbiter in this case merely stated that petitioner wasentitled to bac8wa es! (6 th month pay and service incentive leave pay withouthowever includin a computation of the alle ed amounts.

9 9 9 9

In the case of NFL! v. La"ri"o III this Court postulated that Dprivaterespondents cannot be e9pected to post such appeal bond equivalent to theamount of the monetary award when the amount thereof was not included in

the decision of the labor arbiter.D The computation of the amount awarded topetitioner not havin been clearly stated in the decision of the labor arbiter!private respondents had no basis for determinin the amount of the bond to beposted.

Thus! while the requirements for perfectin an appeal must be strictly followedas they are considered indispensable interdictions a ainst needless delays andfor orderly dischar e of judicial business! the law does admit of e9ceptionswhen warranted by the circumstances. Technicality should not be allowed tostand in the way of equitably and completely resolvin the ri hts andobli ations of the parties. ut while this Court may rela9 the observance ofre lementary periods and technical rules to achieve substantial justice! it is notprepared to ive due course to this petition and ma8e a pronouncement on thewei hty issue obtainin in this case until the law has been duly complied withand the requisite appeal bond duly paid by private respondents. '(?)

Records show that P&I has complied with the Court;s directive for the postin of the bondB'(0) thus! that issue has been laid to rest.

"e now proceed to rule on the merits of this case.

The main issue we must resolve is whether petitioner is an employee of P&I! and if the answerbe in the affirmative! whether she was ille ally dismissed.

"e rule for the respondents.

The e9istence of an employer-employee relationship is essentially a question of fact. '3/) Aactualfindin s of quasi-judicial a encies li8e the 7RC are enerally accorded respect and finality ifsupported by substantial evidence. '3()

Considerin ! however! that the C*;s findin s are in direct conflict with those of the 7abor *rbiterand 7RC! this Court must now ma8e its own e9amination and evaluation of the facts of thiscase.

It is true that petitioner herself admitted that she Dwas not! and 'had) never been consideredrespondent;s employee because the terms of wor8s were arbitrarily decided upon by therespondent.D '33) >owever! the employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law

and not by what the parties say it should be.'36)

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This Court has constantly adhered to the Dfour-fold testD to determine whether there e9ists anemployer-employee relationship between parties. '34) The four elements of an employmentrelationship are@ +a, the selection and en a ement of the employeeB +b, the payment of wa esB+c, the power of dismissalB and +d, the employer;s power to control the employee;s conduct. '3 )

$f these four elements! it is the power of control which is the most crucial '3

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si nificant! throu h the 7ifestyle #ection =ditor. The P=TITI$ =R had to discussthe topics first and submit the articles two days before publication date to 8eepher column in the newspaper space re ularly as e9pected or without miss by itsreaders. '6()

iven this discussion by petitioner! we then as8 the question@ Is this the #orm o# $ontrol thatour labor la%s $ontemplate su$h as to establish an employer&employee relationship bet%een

petitioner an" respon"ent PDI'

It is not.

Petitioner has misconstrued the Dcontrol test!D as did the 7abor *rbiter and the 7RC.

ot all rules imposed by the hirin party on the hired party indicate that the latter is anemployee of the former. Rules which serve as eneral uidelines towards the achievement ofthe mutually desired result are not indicative of the power of control. '63) Thus! this Court hase9plained@

It should! however! be obvious that not every form of control that the hirinparty reserves to himself over the conduct of the party hired in relation to theservices rendered may be accorded the effect of establishin an employer-employee relationship between them in the le al or technical sense of the term.* line must be drawn somewhere! if the reco ni%ed distinction between anemployee and an individual contractor is not to vanish alto ether. Realistically!it would be a rare contract of service that ives untrammelled freedom to theparty hired and eschews any intervention whatsoever in his performance of theen a ement.

7o ically! the line should be drawn between rules that merely serve asuidelines towards the achievement of the mutually desired result without

dictatin the means or methods to be employed in attainin it! and those thatcontrol or fi9 the methodolo y and bind or restrict the party hired to the use ofsuch means. The first! which aim only to promote the result! create noemployer-employee relationship unli8e the second! which address both theresult and the means used to achieve it. 9 9 9. '66)

The main determinant therefore is whether the rules set by the employer are meant to controlnot just the results of the wor8 but also the means and method to be used by the hired party inorder to achieve such results. Thus! in this case! we are to e9amine the factors enumerated bypetitioner to see if these are merely uidelines or if they indeed fulfill the requirements of thecontrol test.

Petitioner believes that respondents; acts are meant to control how she e9ecutes her wor8. "edo not a ree. * careful e9amination reveals that the factors enumerated by the petitioner areinherent conditions in runnin a newspaper. In other words! the so-called control as to time!space! and discipline are dictated by the very nature of the newspaper business itself.

"e a ree with the observations of the $ffice of the #olicitor eneral that@

The Inquirer is the publisher of a newspaper of eneral circulation which iswidely read throu hout the country. *s such! public interest dictates that everyarticle appearin in the newspaper should subscribe to the standards set by theInquirer! with its thousands of readers in mind. It is not! therefore! unusual forthe Inquirer to control what would be published in the newspaper. "hat isimportant is the fact that such control pertains only to the end result! i.e.! thesubmitted articles. The Inquirer has no control over 'petitioner) as to the

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means or method used by her in the preparation of her articles. The articles aredone by 'petitioner) herself without any intervention from the Inquirer. '64)

Petitioner has not shown that P&I! actin throu h its editors! dictated how she was to write orproduce her articles each wee8. *side from the constraints presented by the space allocation ofher column! there were no restraints on her creativityB petitioner was free to write her column inthe manner and style she was accustomed to and to use whatever research method she deemedsuitable for her purpose. The apparent limitation that she had to write only on subjects thatbefitted the 7ifestyle section did not translate to control! but was simply a lo ical consequenceof the fact that her column appeared in that section and therefore had to cater to the preferenceof the readers of that section.

The perceived constraint on petitioner;s column was dictated by her own choice of her column;sperspective. The column title DAeminist ReflectionsD was of her own choosin ! as she herselfadmitted! since she had been 8nown as a feminist writer. '6 ) Thus! respondent P&I! as well asher readers! could reasonably e9pect her columns to spea8 from such perspective.

Contrary to petitioner;s protestations! it does not appear that there was any actual restraint or

limitation on the subject matter - within the 7ifestyle section - that she could write about.Respondent P&I did not dictate how she wrote or what she wrote in her column. either didP&I;s uidelines dictate the 8ind of research! time! and effort she put into each column. In fact!petitioner herself said that she received Dno comments on her articles...e9cept for her to shortenthem to fit into the bo9 allotted to her column.D Therefore! the control that P&I e9ercised overpetitioner was only as to the finished product of her efforts! i.e. ! the column itself! by way ofeither shortenin or outri ht rejection of the column.

The newspaper;s power to approve or reject publication of any specific article she wrote for hercolumn cannot be the control contemplated in the Dcontrol test!D as it is but lo ical that one whocommissions another to do a piece of wor8 should have the ri ht to accept or reject the product.The important factor to consider in the Dcontrol testD is still the element of control over how the

wor8 itself is done! not just the end result thereof.

In contrast! a re ular reporter is not as independent in doin his or her wor8 for the newspaper."e note the common practice in the newspaper business of assi nin its re ular reporters tocover specific subjects! eo raphical locations! overnment a encies! or areas of concern! morecommonly referred to as Dbeats.D * reporter must produce stories within his or her particularbeat and cannot switch to another beat without permission from the editor. In most newspapersalso! a reporter must inform the editor about the story that he or she is wor8in on for the day.The story or article must also be submitted to the editor at a specified time. 5oreover! theeditor can easily pull out a reporter from one beat and as8 him or her to cover another beat! ifthe need arises.

This is not the case for petitioner. *lthou h petitioner had a wee8ly deadline to meet! she wasnot precluded from submittin her column ahead of time or from submittin columns to bepublished at a later time. 5ore importantly! respondents did not dictate upon petitioner thesubject matter of her columns! but only imposed the eneral uideline that the article shouldconform to the standards of the newspaper and the eneral tone of the particular section.

"here a person who wor8s for another performs his job more or less at his own pleasure! in themanner he sees fit! not subject to definite hours or conditions of wor8! and is compensatedaccordin to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof! no employer-employeerelationship e9ists. '6

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a reement or contract on which to base the relationship. In our jurisdiction! the benchmar8 ofeconomic reality in analy%in possible employment relationships for purposes of applyin the7abor Code ou ht to be the economic dependence of the wor8er on his employer. '6?)

Petitioner;s main occupation is not as a columnist for respondent but as a women;s ri htsadvocate wor8in in various women;s or ani%ations. '60) 7i8ewise! she herself admits that shealso contributes articles to other publications. '4/) Thus! it cannot be said that petitioner wasdependent on respondent P&I for her continued employment in respondent;s line of business. '4()

The inevitable conclusion is that petitioner was not respondent P&I;s employee but anindependent contractor! en a ed to do independent wor8.

There is no infle9ible rule to determine if a person is an employee or an independent contractorBthus! the characteri%ation of the relationship must be made based on the particularcircumstances of each case. '43) There are several factors '46) that may be considered by thecourts! but as we already said! the ri ht to control is the dominant factor in determininwhether one is an employee or an independent contractor. '44)

In our jurisdiction! the Court has held that an independent contractor is one who carries on adistinct and independent business and underta8es to perform the job! wor8! or service on one;sown account and under one;s own responsibility accordin to one;s own manner and method!free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with theperformance of the wor8 e9cept as to the results thereof. '4 )

$n this point! Son(a v. )*S&C*N *roa"$astin+ Corporation '4

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not to broadcast #$ H*;s show but * #-C must still pay his talent fees infull.

Clearly! * #-C ;s ri ht not to broadcast #$ H*;s show! burdened as it wasby the obli ation to continue payin in full #$ H*;s talent fees! did not amountto control over the means and methods of the performance of #$ H*;s wor8.* #-C could not terminate or discipline #$ H* even if the means andmethods of performance of his wor8 - how he delivered his lines and appearedon television - did not meet * #-C ;s approval. This proves that * #-C ;scontrol was limited only to the result of #$ H*;s wor8! whether to broadcastthe final product or not. In either case! * #-C must still pay #$ H*;s talentfees in full until the e9piry of the * reement.

In ,au+han et al. v. -arner et al. ! the Enited #tates Circuit Court of *ppealsruled that vaudeville performers were independent contractors althou h themana ement reserved the ri ht to delete objectionable features in their shows.#ince the mana ement did not have control over the manner of performance ofthe s8ills of the artists! it could only control the result of the wor8 by deletin

objectionable features.

#$ H* further contends that * #-C e9ercised control over his wor8 bysupplyin all equipment and crew. o doubt! * #-C supplied the equipment!crew and airtime needed to broadcast the D5el 2ayD pro rams. >owever! theequipment! crew and airtime are not the Dtools and instrumentalitiesD #$ H*needed to perform his job. "hat #$ H* principally needed were his talent ors8ills and the costumes necessary for his appearance. =ven thou h * #-Cprovided #$ H* with the place of wor8 and the necessary equipment! #$ H*was still an independent contractor since * #-C did not supervise andcontrol his wor8. * #-C ;s sole concern was for #$ H* to display his talentdurin the airin of the pro rams.

* radio broadcast specialist who wor8s under minimal supervision is anindependent contractor. #$ H*;s wor8 as television and radio pro ram hostrequired special s8ills and talent! which #$ H* admittedly possesses. Therecords do not show that * #-C e9ercised any supervision and control overhow #$ H* utili%ed his s8ills and talent in his shows. ' ()

The instant case presents a parallel to Son(a . Petitioner was en a ed as a columnist for hertalent! s8ill! e9perience! and her unique viewpoint as a feminist advocate. >ow she utili%ed allthese in writin her column was not subject to dictation by respondent. *s in Son(a ! respondentP&I was not involved in the actual performance that produced the finished product. It onlyreserved the ri ht to shorten petitioner;s articles based on the newspaper;s capacity toaccommodate the same. This fact! we note! was not unique to petitioner;s column. It is a realityin the newspaper business that space constraints often dictate the len th of articles andcolumns! even those that re ularly appear therein.

Aurthermore! respondent P&I did not supply petitioner with the tools and instrumentalities sheneeded to perform her wor8. Petitioner only needed her talent and s8ill to come up with acolumn every wee8. *s such! she had all the tools she needed to perform her wor8.

Considerin that respondent P&I was not petitioner;s employer! it cannot be held uilty of ille aldismissal.

WHERE#ORE ! the fore oin premises considered! the Petition is $ISMISSE$ . The &ecisionand Resolution of the Court of *ppeals in C*- .R. #P o. /01/ are hereby A##IRME$ .

SO OR$ERE$ .

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