Consti Batch 5

8/10/2019 Consti Batch 5

1/322

ADDITIONAL ASSIGNMENTSECTION 1-S & 1-BCONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

Section 21Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (203 SCRA 767 [1991])Arnault v. Nazareno (87 PHIL. 29 [1950])Senate of the Phil. Vs. Ermita (488 SCRA 1; April 20, 2006)

Section 22

Senate of the Phil. Vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, April 20 2006)

Section 24

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance (235 SCRA 630 [1994])Alvarez, et al. Vs. Guingona, et al. (252 SCRA 695 [1996])

Section 25

Garcia v. Mata (65 SCRA 517 [1975])Demetria v. Alba (148 SCRA 208 [1987])Philconsa v. Enriquez (235 SCRA 506 [1994])

Section 26

Philconsa v. Gimenez (15 SCRA 479 [1965])Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board (151 SCRA 208 [1987]Philippine Judges Asso. V. Prado (227 SCRA 703 [1993])Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance ( 235 SCRA 630 [1994])Tobias v. Abalos (239 SCRA 106 [1994])

Section 27

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance (235 SCRA 630 [1994)Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990])Bengzon v. Drilon (208 SCRA 133 [1992])

Philconsa v. Enriquez (235 SCRA 506 [1994])

Section 28

Kapatiran ng mgaNaglilingkodsaPamahalaan ng Pil. v. Tan (163 SCRA 371 [1988])Province of Abra v. Judge Hernando (107 SCRA 104 [August 31, 1981])Abra Valley College v. Aquino (162 SCRA 106 [1988])


2/322

Section 29

Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works (110 PHIL. 331 [1960])Aglipay v. Ruiz (64 PHIL. 201 [1937])Guingona v. Carague (196 SCRA 221 [1991])

Philconsa vs. Enriquez (235 SCRA 506 [1994)

Section 30

Diaz v. CA (238 SCRA 785 [1994])

Section 32

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC (262 SCRA 292 [September 26, 1996])

ATTY. ROCHELLE DAKANAY-GALANO

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON,VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSEV.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS,ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP,petitioners,vs.THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, representedby and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAADA, respondents,JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor .

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.

Balgos & Perez for intervening petitioner.

Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro for respondents.


3/322

PADILLA,J .: p

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporaryrestraining order and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate BlueRibbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidenceat its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdezto the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.

On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PresidentialCommission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General,filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled"Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", forreconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/oramplifying the allegations therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 theherein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants.

The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, allegesamong others that:

14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette GomezRomualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert withDefendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking

undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection withthe latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes andstrategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiffand the Filipino people, among others:

(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration ofDefendants Sene J. Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho,Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C.Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon,Jr. and his law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso,

Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr.,and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellowsenior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups ofcompanies such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills,Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C.Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of thebiggest business enterprises in the Philippines, such asthe Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet


4/322

Consolidated and the Philippine CommercialInternational Bank (PCI Bank) by employing deviousfinancial schemes and techniques calculated to requirethe massive infusion and hemorrhage of governmentfunds with minimum or negligible "cashout" fromDefendant Benjamin Romualdez...

xxx xxx xxx

(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance andcollaboration of Philgurantee officials led by chairmanCesar E.A. Virata and the Senior managers ofFMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr.,Jose M. Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., amongothers, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without

infusing additional capital solely for the purpose ofErectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amountof P527,387,440.71 with insufficientsecurities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc, toappear viable and to borrow more capitals, so much sothat its obligation with Philgurantee has reached a totalof more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987.

(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/orwithin the week following the February 1986 People'sRevolution, in conspiracy with, supoort, assistance andcollaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of theBengzon Law Offices, or specifically Defendants JoseF.S. Bengzon, Jr., V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino,Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., manipulated,shcemed, and/or executed a series of devices intendedto conceal and place, and/or for the purpose ofconcealing and placing, beyond the inquiry and

jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on GoodGovernment (PCGG) herein Defendant's individual andcollective funds, properties, and assets subject of and/orsuited int he instant Complaint.

(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how andlegalitic talents of the FMMC senior manager and someof the Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S.Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V.Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C.


5/322

Cruz, the purported sale of defendant BenjaminRomualdez's interests in the (i) Professional Managers,(ii) A & E International Corporation (A & E), (iii) FirstManila Managerment Corporation (FMMC), (iv)Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI) and its subsidiariesconsisting of 36 corporations in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc.(wjose purported incorporations are all members of Atty.Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million onMarch 3, 1986 or three days after the creation of thePresidential Commission on Good Government onFebruary 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of deceivingand preempting the Government, particularly thePCGG, and making it appear that defendant BenjaminRomualdez had already divested himself of hisownership of the same when in truth and in fact, his

interests are well intact and being protected by Atty.Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners,together with the FMMC senior managers who stillcontrol and run the affiars of said corporations, and inorder to entice the PCGG to approve the said fictitioussale, the above-named defendants offered P20 millionas "donation" to the Government;

(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technicalassitance of the Bengzon law firm represented by Atty.

Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel, together withdefendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario D.Camacho amd Senen J. Gabaldon as members of theBoard of Directors of the Philippine CommercialInternational bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund(Fund, for short) in the amount of P25 million by cuasingit to be invested in the PCIB and through the Bank'sTSG, assigned to PCI Development and PCI Equity at50% each, the Fund's (a) 8,028.011 common shares inthe Bank and (b) "Deposit in Subscription" in theamount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreedconsideration of P28 million for the said assignment,PCI Development and PCI Equity were able to pay onlyP5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization ofP3,937,500.00 thus prompting the Fund to rescind itsassignment, and the consequent reversion of theassigned brought the total shareholding of the Fund to11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock


6/322


7/322

otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the Romualdez companies" weresold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase of the corporations, for the same price of P5 millionwhich was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets. 3

On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan PonceEnrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senateon the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged"take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management ofCompanies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look intothe possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic

Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 4

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate tothe Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue RibbonCommittee). 5 Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopawere subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporationsbelonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on theground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil CaseNo. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewiserefused to testify involing his constitutional right to due process, and averring thatthe publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could adverselyaffect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and

directed the petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issuesraised, after which, it issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused fromtestifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented. 7

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena themand required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before theCommittee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear andblatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparabledamager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain,speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filedthe present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning orderand/or injunctive relief.

Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before theSandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion forintervention, 8 which the Court granted in the resolution 9 of 21 December 1989, and required the respondent Senate Blue RibbonCommittee to comment on the petition in intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed itscomment 10 thereon.


8/322

Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will firsttackle the jurisdictional question raised by the respondent Committee.

In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properlyinquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations,much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and special commitees like what petitioners seek from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under thedoctrine of separation of powers, which obtaines in our present system ofgovernment.

The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system ofgovernment. It obtains not hrough express provision but by actualdivision in our Constitution. Each department of the government has

exclusive cognizance of matters wihtin its jurisdiction, and issupreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the factthat the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that theConstitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained andindependent of each other. The Constitution has provided for anelaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination inthe workings of the various departments of the government...

xxx xxx xxx

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokesand in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislativeand the judicial departments of the government. The ovelapping andinterlacing of funcstions and duties between the severaldeaprtments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just wherethe political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution areapt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated, in cases ofconflict, the judicial departments is the only constitutional organwhich can be called upon to determine the proper allocation ofpowers between the several departments and among the integral orconstituent units thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who isto determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? TheConstitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciaryas the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate


9/322

constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over theother departments; it does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act ofthe legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligationassigned to it by tyhe Constitution to determine conflicting claims ofauthority under the Constitution and to established for the parties inan actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures andguarantess to them. This is in thruth all that is involved in what istermed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicialreview under the Constitution. Even the, this power of judicial reviewis limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after fullopportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to theconstitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Anyattempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legalquestions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not

pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.More thatn that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality tolegislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumedto abide by the Constitution but also becuase the judiciary in thedetermination of actual cases and controversies must reflect thewisdom and justice of the people as expressed through theirrepresentatives in the executive and legislative departments of thegovernment.

The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr

under the Constitution. Moreowever, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political questiondoctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries hasbeen given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means doesaway with kthe applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."13

The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the presentcontroversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power ofthe Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affirs inpurported aid of legislation.

Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) theSenate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., itis not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdezcorporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of theSenate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates theirright to due process.

The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congressto conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:


10/322

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respectivecommittee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordancewith its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of personsappearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 15

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation isnot, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigationmust be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules ofprocedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by suchinquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under theBill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the rightnot to be compelled to testify against one's self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for

in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid ofLegislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination ofany law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of futurelegislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by theConstitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.

As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of thelegislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or toexpel a member.

Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any

committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which intis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In ordertherefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had tothe speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.

A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made astatement which was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over the FMMC Group ofCompanies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrileon 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the FMMCGroup of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himselfcategorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that thesesrepeated allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baselessas they are malicious.

The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also


11/322

to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he(Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, amongothers, as follows:

Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege;the privilege being that I received, Mr. President, a letter dated

September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or BabyLopa, wherein he denied categorically that he has taken over theFirst Manila Management Group of Companies which includesSOLOIL Incorporated.

xxx xxxx xxx

In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an OfficialMemorandum to the Presidential Commission of Good Governmentwritten and signed by former Governor, now Congressman JoseRamirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force forRegion VIII. In his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then GovernorRamirez stated that when he and the members of his task forcesought to serve a sequestration order on the management ofSOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him thatrelatives of the President of the Philippines were personallydiscussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order ofsequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr.Ricardo A. Lopa.

I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.

The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and Iquote, Mr. President:

"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leytewas not heeded by management because they saidanother representation was being made to thisCommission for the ventual lifting of oursequestrationorder. They even assured us that Mr.Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were personally

discussing and representing SOLOIL, so the order ofsequestration will finally be lifted. While we attempted tocarry on our order, management refused to cooperateand vehemently turned down our request to makeavailable to us the records of the company. In fact it wasobviously clear that they will meet us with forcethemoment we insist on doing normally our assigned task.


12/322

In view of the impending threat, and to avoid anyuntoward incident we decided to temporarily suspendour work until there is a more categorical stand of thisCommission in view of the seemingly influentialrepresetation being made by SOLOIL for us not tocontinue our work."

Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraphfive, which reads as follows, and I quote Mr. President:

"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, thePresident of SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr.Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty. MandongMendiola are now saying that there have beendivestment, and that the new owner is now Mr. Ricardo

Lopa who according to them, is the brother-in-law of thePresident. They even went further by telling us thateven Peping Cojuangco who we know is the brother ofher excellency is also interested in the ownership andmanagement of SOLOIL. When he demanded forsupporting papers which will indicate aforesaiddivestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and Mendiolarefused vehemently to submit these papers to us,instead they said it will be submitted directly to thisCommission. To our mind their continuous dropping of

names is not good for this Commission and even to thePresident if our dersire is to achieve respectability andstability of the government."

The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and nowCongressman Jose Ramirez were personally confirmed by him in anews interview last September 7, 1988.

xxx xxxx xxx

Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. RicardoLopa himself in August 11, 1988 issue of thenewspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of RomualdezFirms."

Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and Iquote him:


13/322

12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is underreview by the PCGG solely to determine the appropriateprice. The sale of these companies and our prior rigthtto requires them have never been at issue.

Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was notreally making baseless and malicious statements.

Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:

Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into thepossible violation of the law in the case particularly with regard toRepublic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote:

Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall beunlawful for the spouse or for nay relative, byconsanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, ofthe President of the Philippines, the Vice-President ofthe Philippines, the President of the Senate, or theSpeaker of the House of Representatives, to intervenedirectly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,contract or application with the Government: Provided,that this section shall not apply to any person who priorto the assumption of office of any of the above officialsto whom he is related, has been already dealing withthe Government along the same line of business, nor toany transaction, contract or application filed by him forapproval of which is not discretionary on the part of theofficials concerned but depends upon compliance withrequisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfullyperformed in an official capacity or in the exercise of aprofession.

Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leaveit to this august Body to make its own conclusion.

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplatedlegislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation ofSec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted byrespondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives ofPresident Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in


14/322

connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging toBenjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be,therefore, no intended legislation involved.

The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument thatthe questioned inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212.The said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in view of therepresentaions made by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth ofnon-governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and SportsDevelopment, to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3)stockholders of Oriental petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a "get-rich-quickscheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm.Thepertinent portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than theSolicitor-General has stated that the PCGG Chairman and at leastthree Commissioners should resign and that the agency should riditself of "ineptness, incompetence and corruption" and that theSandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to answercharges filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it hasadopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in asequestered oil exploration firm;

WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth ofnon-governmental organization had made representations to theSenate Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look intothe charges against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of thechanges expected by the people when the EDSA revolution tookplace and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund priorityprojects which will benefit our people such as CARP, free educationin the elementary and secondary levels reforestration, andemployment generation for rural and urban workers;

WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship mustdemonstrate in their public and private lives integrity, honor andefficient management of government services lest our youth becomedisillusioned and lose hope and return to an Idelogy and form ofgovernment which is repugnant to true freedom, democraticparticipation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it.


15/322

Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the PresidentialCommission on Good Government be investigated by theappropriate Committee in connection with the implementation ofSection 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.19

Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the chargesagainst the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum inconnection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of theConstitution.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of theprivilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group isto be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, SenatorEnrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the

herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee isnot really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within the

jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whetheror not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appearsmore within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, theCourt may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency ofthis case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held held:

... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in thelegislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses inquiriesconcerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed,or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in oursocial,economic, or political system for the purpose of enablingCongress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departmentsof the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency orwaste. But broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited.Thereis no general authority to expose the private affairs ofindividualswithout justification in terms of the functions of congress. This wasfreely conceded by Solicitor General in his argument in this case.Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These arefunctions of the executive and judicial departments of government.No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtheranceof a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted soly forthe personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish"those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)


16/322

It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct itsinvestigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already beenfiled with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of itsprincipal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is thealleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filingof petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated bythe respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired bythe Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. Toallow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issuealready before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility ofconflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but ifthe Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan,the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of theSandiganbayan can not be discounted.

In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be anencroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had muchearlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that:

Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Sincecongress may only investigate into those areas in which it maypotentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matterswhich are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches

of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary,it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of theJudiciary. Neither can it suplant the Executive in what exclusivelybelongs to the Executive. ...

Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's rightto inquire is 'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution ongovernmental action,' including "'the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'."22

In another case

... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify aninquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is theexeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of theCongress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. Wecannot simply assume, however, that every congressionalinvestigation is justified by a public need that over-balances anyprivate rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the


17/322

responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insurethat the Congress does not unjustifiably encroah upon an individual'sright to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion orassembly. 23

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the rightagainst self-incrimination. 24 Thir right constured as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by theaccused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.

This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. TheHonorable Court of Appeals, et al. 25 thus

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from anordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled totake the witness stand and claim the privilege as each questionrequiring an incriminating answer is hot at him, an accused mayaltother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer anyall questions.

Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrativeinvestigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding oranalogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, 26 the Court reiterated thedoctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only incriminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit

It was held that:

We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and thecase is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witnessstand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answerthat will incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is notthe characeter of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedingsthat controls. The privilege has consistenly been held to extend to allproceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishmentis sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.

We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners maynot be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produceevidenc before it, it is only becuase we hold that the questioned inquiry is not inaid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separationof powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government,ordained by the Constitution.


18/322

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts,including the circumtance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendantsin a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related tothe subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet Committee, therespondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compellingthe petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the saidinquiry.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Digest

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991Padilla, J.:

Facts: 1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the Sandiganbayan for

the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government corporations to the group ofLopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.

2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the transactions, aninvestigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa weresubpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale

of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez." 3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the

defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.

4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction ofthe Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction andlegislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed withthe Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it and required the respondent Senate BlueRibbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.

ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation NO.

1. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the inquiry to beconducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find outwhether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 inconnection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdezto the Lopa Group.


19/322

2. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or

unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation mustbe "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights ofpersons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of

persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right notto be compelled to testify against one's self.

3. The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and inquire intothe same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue would not only pose the possibility ofconflicting judgments between the legislative committee and a judicial tribunal.

4. Finally, a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by theConstitution on governmental action including the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of theserights is the right of an individual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent is extended torespondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the nature of a criminal proceedingor analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the petitioners may not be compelled by respondentCommittee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid oflegislation and if pursued would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between thelegislative and the judicial departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,vs.LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIOBALAGTAS, Director of Prisons, respondents.

J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, LorenzoTaada, and Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.

OZAETA, J . :


20/322


21/322

agreed to pay P5000,000 within one year and the remainder in annualinstallments of P500,000 each, with the stipulation that failure on his part to makeany of said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of P10,000and would entitle the Hospital to rescind to sale to him. Aside from the downpayment of P10,000, Burt has made no other payment on account of thepurchase price of said estate.

The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company.On May 14, 1946, the Philippine Trust Company sold estate for the sum ofP1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000 down and promise to payP90,000 within nine months and the balance of P1,100,000 in ten successiveinstallments of P110,000 each. The nine-month period within which to pay thefirst installment of P90,000 expired on February 14, 1947, without Burt's havingpaid the said or any other amount then or afterwards. On September 4, 1947, thePhilippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate

to the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of sale in considerationof the sum of P750,000. On February 5, 1948, the Rural Progress Administrationmade, under article 1504 of the Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt for theresolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the Philippine TrustCompany due to his failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within the period ofnine months. Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered thecancellation of Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in thename of the Rural Progress Administration, from which order he appealed to theSupreme Court. 1

It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three precedingparagraphs that the Philippine Government, through the Secretary of Justice asChairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and asChairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from whichthe money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in thelatter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads asfollows:

RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATETHE BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.

WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine government, through the RuralProgress Administration, has bought the Buenavista and the TambobongEstates for the aggregate sum of five million pesos;


22/322

WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Courtdated October 31, 1949, the Buenavista Estate could have been bought forthree million pesos by virtue of a contract entered into between the SanJuan de Dios Hospital and Philippine Government in 1939;

WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not haveto purchase the Buenavista Estate because the occupation governmenthad made tender of payment in the amount of three million pesos,Japanese currency, which fact is believed sufficient to vest title ofOwnership in the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to decisions of theSupreme Court sustaining the validity of payments made in Japanesemilitary notes during the occupation;

WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have topay a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already

practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine TrustCompany dated September 3, 194, for seven hundred and fifty thousandpesos, and by virtue of the recission of the contract through which ErnestH. Burt had an interest in the estate; Now, therefore, be it.

RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created,composed of five members to be appointed by the President of the Senateto investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be theduty of the said Committee to determine whether the said purchase washonest, valid, and proper and whether the price involved in the deal wasfair and just, the parties responsible therefor, and any other facts theCommittee may deem proper in the premises. Said Committee shall havethe power to conduct public hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena ducestecum to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production ofdocuments before it; and may require any official or employee of anybureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of theGovernment to assist or otherwise cooperate with the Special Committeein the performance of its functions and duties. Said Committee shall submitits report of findings and recommendations within two weeks from theadoption of this Resolution.

The special committee created by the above resolution called and examinedvarious witnesses, among the most important of whom was the herein petitioner,Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolvewas that involved in the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of theGovernment's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interestof only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anywaylong before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were


23/322

responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of theGovernment.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 weredelivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date heopened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine NationalBank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that onthe same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000,which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with thePhilippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which hehimself cashed. It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimaterecipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case.

At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:

Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for questions involvingthe disposition of funds, I take the position that the transactions were legal,that no laws were being violated, and that all requisites had been compliedwith. Here also I acted in a purely functional capacity of representative. Ibeg to be excused from making answer which might later be used againstme. I have been assured that it is my constitutional right to refuse toincriminate myself, and I am certain that the Honorable Members of thisCommittee, who, I understand, are lawyers, will see the justness of myposition.

At as subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera, amember of the committee, interrogated him as follows:

Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your owntypewritten statement, were legal?

Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.

Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved, according toyour own statement, did not violate any law?

Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.x x x x x x x x x

Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such a mannerthat no laws were violated, how is it that when you were asked by the


24/322

Committee to tell what steps you took to have this money delivered to Burt,you refused to answer the questions, saying that it would incriminate you?

Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in hisdealings with other people.

x x x x x x x x x

Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was disposed ofbecause you would be incriminated, or you would be incriminatingsomebody?

Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on the privilege to dispose ofthe money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transactionwithout having to account for any use of it.

But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, SenatorSumulong, interrogated the petitioner, the latter testified as follows:

The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also made onOctober 29, 1949, is payable to cash; and upon cashing this P440,000 onOctober 29, 1949, what did you do with that amount?

Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you deliveredthese P440,000 which you cashed on October 29, 1949?

Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a representative ofBurt.

The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you delivered the

P440,000 was a Filipino?Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that representative ofBurt to whom you delivered this big amount of P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name.


25/322

The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to whom youdelivered the big amount on October 29, 1949, gave you a receipt for theamount?

Mr. ARNAULT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask a receipt?

Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask.

The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person, representativeof Burt, this big amount of P440,000 which forms part of the P1- millionpaid to Burt?

Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction?

Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing?

Mr. ARNAULT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. By cable?

Mr. ARNAULT. No.The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that instruction?

Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction from Burt todeliver these P440,000 to a certain person whose name you do not like toreveal?

Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply with the request of the person.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction given to you by Burt wasverbal?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by Burt?


26/322

Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.

The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal instruction;when Burt was still here in the Philippines?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he would receivethe money?

Mr. ARNAULT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he was here in thePhilippines gave you the verbal instruction?

Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.

The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for Burt to meritreceiving these P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the verbalinstruction why that certain person should receive these P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.

The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big amount tothat certain person without receipt?

Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would represent him andwhere could I meet him.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as early as1946?

Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that.


27/322

The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention in theprosecution of the two cases involving the Buenavista and Tambobongestates?

Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high governmentofficial?

Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that certain person?

Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot remember thename.

The CHAIRMAN. When gave that certain person that P440,000 onOctober 29, 1949, you knew already that person?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times.

The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a Filipino name?

Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.

The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a Spanishname?Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name?

Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.

The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which according to yourrecollection is Spanish; can you remember the first letter with which that

family name begins?Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family name?

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.


28/322

The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you havedelivered this P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Several times?Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.

The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that person two orthree times, you never were able to find out what was his name?

Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta knowsmy name; of course, we have not done business. Lots of people in Manilaknow me, but they don't know my name, and I don't know them. They sa{ Iam "chiflado" because I don't know their names.

The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or female?

Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.

The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least?

Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 or 40 years, more or less.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of thatcertain person? What is his complexion: light, dark or light brown?

Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to Senator Cabili),but smaller. He walks very straight, with military bearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain person to

whom you gave the P440,000?Mr. ARNAULT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met that certainperson, you never came to know his residence?

Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office.


29/322

The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person?

Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6.

On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate, whichapproved and read to him the following resolution:

Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled:

That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned forcontempt consisting of contumacious acts committed by him during theinvestigation conducted by the Special Committee created by SenateResolution No. 8 to probe the Tambobong and Buenavista estates deal ofOctober 21, 1949, and that the President of the Senate propounded to himthe following interrogatories:

1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of theperson to whom you gave the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a personwhose name it is impossible for you not to remember not only because ofthe big amount of money you gave to him without receipt, but also by yourown statements you knew him as early as 1946 when General Ernest H.Burt was still in the Philippines, you made two other deliveries of money tohim without receipt, and the last time you saw him was in December 1949?

Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written answeralleging that the questions were incriminatory in nature and begging leave to beallowed to stand on his constitutional right not to be compelled to be a witnessagainst himself. Not satisfied with that written answer Senator Sumulong, overthe objection of counsel for the petitioner, propounded to the latter the followingquestion:

Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee askedyou for the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000, you saidthat you can [could] not remember his name. That was the reason then forrefusing to reveal the name of the person. Now, in the answer that youhave just cited, you are refusing to reveal the name of that person to whomyou gave the P440,000 on the ground that your answer will be self-incriminating. Now, do I understand from you that you are abandoning yourformer claim that you cannot remember the name of that person, and thatyour reason now for your refusal to reveal the name of that person is thatyour answer might be self-incriminating? In other words, the question isthis: What is your real reason for refusing to reveal the name of that person


30/322

to whom you gave the P440,000: that you do not remember his name orthat your answer would be self-incriminating?

x x x x x x x x x

Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedurethat the accused should not be required to testify unless he so desires.

The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question.The question is very clear. It does not incriminate him.

x x x x x x x x x

Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before theSenate Committee on the first, second, and third hearings to which I was

made in my letter to this Senate of May 2, 1950, in which I gave all thereasons that were in my powers to give, as requested. I cannot changeanything in those statements that I made because they represent the bestthat I can do , to the best of my ability.

The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer hasnothing to do with the question.

Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you , Mr. Arnault, that the reasonthat you gave during the investigation for not revealing the name of theperson to whom you gave the P440,000 is not the same reason that youare now alleging because during the investigation you told us: "I do notremember his name." But, now, you are now saying: "My answer mightincriminate me." What is your real position?

Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements that I madeat the first, second, and third hearings. I said that I wanted to be excusedfrom answering the question. I beg to be excused from making any answerthat might be incriminating in nature. However, in this answer, if the detailof not remembering the name of the person has not been included, it is anoversight.

Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple question:Do you remember or not the name of the person to whom you gave theP440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember .


31/322

Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of that person,how can you say that your answer might be incriminating? If you do notremember his name, you cannot answer the question; so how could youranswer be self-incriminating? What do you say to that?

Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain. Please, I do notsee how to answer those questions. That is why I asked for a lawyer, so hecan help me. I have no means of knowing what the situation is about. Ihave been in jail 13 days without communication with the outside. Howcould I answer the question? I have no knowledge of legal procedure orrule, of which I am completely ignorant.

x x x x x x x x x

Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be answered.

The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the question. It is veryclear. It does not incriminate the witness.

x x x x x x x x x

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my constitutional rights. Ibeg to be excused from making further answer, please.

Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent addressed tothe President of the Senate, dated May 2, 1950, you stated there that youcannot reveal the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000because if he is a public official you might render yourself liable forprosecution for bribery, and that if he is a private individual you mightrender yourself liable for prosecution for slander. Why did you make thosestatements when you cannot even tell us whether that person to whom yougave the P440,000 is a public official or a private individual ? We are givingyou this chance to convince the Senate that all these allegations of yoursthat your answers might incriminate you are given by you honestly or youare just trying to make a pretext for not revealing the information desiredby the Senate.

The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question.

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question. (The question isrestated and explained.)


32/322

Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2, was prepared by a lawyer for me andsigned it. That is all I can say how I stand about this letter. I have noknowledge myself enough to write such a letter, so I had to secure the helpof a lawyer to help me in my period of distress.

In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called toshow cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of the Senate,Senator Sumulong propounded to the petitioner questions tending to elicitinformation from him as to the identity of the person to whom he delivered theP440,000; but the petitioner refused to reveal it by saying that he did notremember. The President of the Senate then propounded to him variousquestions concerning his past activities dating as far back as when witness wasseven years of age and ending as recently as the post liberation period, all ofwhich questions the witness answered satisfactorily. In view thereof, thePresident of the Senate also made an attempt to illicit the desired information

from the witness, as follows:The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good memory.

Answer: Did you deliver the P440,000 as a gift, or of any consideration?

Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it to thatperson, that is all.

The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person?

Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said.

The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least remembranceof the name of that person?

Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.

The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events thathappened a short time ago and, on the other hand, you remember eventsthat occurred during your childhood?

Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain.The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15 hereinabovequoted whereby the petitioner was committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-

Arms and imprisoned until "he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to theSenate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom


33/322

he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connectiontherewith."

The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16) , to wit:

That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 beempowered and directed to continue its investigation of the Tambobongand Buenavista Estates deal of October 21, 1949, more particularly tocontinue the examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of theperson to whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters relatedtherewith.

The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May 18,1950.

The case was argued twice before us. We have given its earnest and prolongedconsideration because it is the first of its kind to arise since the Constitution ofthe Republic of the Philippines was adopted. For the first time this Court is calledupon to define the power of either House of Congress to punish a person not amember for contempt; and we are fully conscious that our pronouncements herewill set an important precedent for the future guidance of all concerned.

Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it necessaryto lay down the general principles of law which form the background of thoseissues.

Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of theGovernment in three independent but coordinate Departments Legislative,Executive, and Judicial. The legislative power is vested in the Congress, whichconsists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.)Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members fordisorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,expel a Member. (Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in theSupreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.(Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the Constitution of the United States, ours does notcontain an express provision empowering either of the two Houses of Congressto punish nonmembers for contempt. It may also be noted that whereas in theUnited States the legislative power is shared by and between the Congress ofthe United States, on the one hand, and the respective legislatures of thedifferent States, on the other the powers not delegated to the United States bythe Constitution nor prohibited by it to States being reserved to the States,respectively, or to the people in the Philippines, the legislative power is vestedin the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may therefore be said that the


34/322


35/322

approved three bills (1) prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or any otherdepartment head from discharging functions and exercising powers other thanthose attached to his own office, without ]previous congressional authorization;(2) prohibiting brothers and near relatives of any President of the Philippines fromintervening directly or indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in whichthe Government is a party, more particularly where the decision lies in the handsof executive or administrative officers who are appointees of the President; and(3) providing that purchases of the Rural Progress Administration of big landedestates at a price of P100,000 or more, shall not become effective withoutprevious congressional confirmation.2

We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by thepetitioner in support of his contention that his commitment is unlawful.

First He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for

refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000,because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended orpurported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has notembarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process. It is argued thatsince the investigating committee has already rendered its report and has madeall its recommendations as to what legislative measures should be takenpursuant to its findings, there is no necessity to force the petitioner to give theinformation desired other than that mentioned in its report, to wit: "In justice toJudge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this atmosphere of suspicion thatnow pervades the public mind must be dissipated, and it can only be done if

appropriate steps are taken by the Senate to compel Arnault to stop pretendingthat he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000and answer the questions which will definitely establish the identity of that person. . ." Senator Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee, who appeared and arguedthe case for the respondents, denied that that was the only purpose of theSenate in seeking the information from the witness. He said that the investigationhad not been completed, because, due to the contumacy of the witness, hiscommittee had not yet determined the parties responsible for the anomaloustransaction as required by Resolution No. 8; that, by Resolution No. 16, hiscommittee was empowered and directed to continue its investigation, moreparticularly to continue its examination of the witness regarding the name of theperson to whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters related therewith; thatthe bills recommended by his committee had not been approved by the Houseand might not be approved pending the completion of the investigation; and thatthose bills were not necessarily all the measures that Congress might deem itnecessary to pass after the investigation is finished.


36/322

Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of alegislative body to make, we think the investigating committee has the power torequire a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject ofcourse to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to bewithin the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material ornecessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as tolegislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator isempowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to thesubject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced toanswer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. Butfrom this it does not follow that every question that may be propounded to awitness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other words,the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to anyproposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack ofnecessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are

determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of theinvestigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a singlequestion.

In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the powerof the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdictionto institute the inquiry or investigation; that once that jurisdiction is conceded, thisCourt cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that theruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witnessis not subject to review by this Court under the principle of the separation of

powers. We have to qualify this proposition. As was said by the Court of Appealsof New York: "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative bodywas with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have noright to assume that the contrary was intended." (People exrel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quotedwith approval by the Supreme Court of the United States in the said case ofMcGrain vs. Daugherty, it is necessary deduction from the decision in ReChapman, 41 L. ed., 1154, that where the questions are not pertinent to thematter under inquiry a witness rightfully may refuse to answer. So we are of theopinion that where the alleged immateriality of the information sought by thelegislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the courtis in duty bound to pass upon the contention. The fact that the legislative bodyhas jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicialintervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.

Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to theresolution of the issue under consideration, we find that the question for therefusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is


37/322

pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed.Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner,requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the partiesresponsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obviousthat the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved insaid deal is pertinent to that determination it is in fact the very thing sought tobe determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to thesubject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposedlegislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislativebody to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to anyproposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent tothe matter under inquiry.

It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended bythe Committee as a result of the uncompleted investigation and that there is no

need for it to know the name of the person to whom the witness gave theP440,000. But aside from the fact that those bills have not yet been approved bythe lower house and by the President and that they may be withdrawn ormodified if after the inquiry is completed they should be found unnecessary orinadequate, there is nothing to prevent the Congress from approving othermeasures it may deem necessary after completing the investigation. We are notcalled upon, nor is it within our province, to determine or imagine what thosemeasures may be. And our inability to do so is no reason for overruling thequestion propounded by the Senate to the witness.

The case of Re Chapman , 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here. Theinquiry there in question was conducted under a resolution of the Senate andrelated to charges, published in the press, that senators were yielding to corruptinfluences in considering a tariff bill then before the Senate and were speculatingin stocks the value of which would be affected by pending amendments to thebill. Chapman, a member of a firm of stock brokers dealing in the stock of the

American Sugar Refining Company, appeared before the committee in responseto a subpoena and asked, among others, the following questions:

Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold any stock orsecurities, known as sugar stocks, for or in the interest, directly orindirectly, of any United Senate senator?

Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of, orin the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?

He refused to answer the questions and was prosecuted under an Act ofCongress for contempt of the Senate. Upon being convicted and sent to jail he


38/322

petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus .One of the questions decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in thatcase was whether the committee had the right to compel the witness to answersaid questions, and the Court held that the committee did have such right,saying:

The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of theinquiry . The resolution directed the committee to inquire whether anysenator has been, or is, speculating in what are known as sugar stocksduring the consideration of the tariff bill now before the Senate." What theSenate might or might not do upon the facts when ascertained, we cannotsay, nor are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures might bedefensible, as contended in argument, but is plain that negative answerswould have cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensiveimputations, while affirmative answers might have led to further action on

the part of the Senate within its constitutional powers. (Emphasissupplied.)

It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the dealis incumbent upon the judicial rather than upon the legislative branch. But wethink there is no basis in fact or in law for such assumption. The petitioner hasnot challenged the validity of Senate Resolution No. 8, and that resolutionexpressly requires the committee to determine the parties responsible for thedeal. We are bound to presume that the Senate has acted in the dueperformance of its constitutional function in instituting the inquiry, if the act is

capable of being so construed. On the other hand, there is no suggestion that the judiciary has instituted an inquiry to determine the parties responsible for thedeal. Under the circumstances of the case, it appearing that the questionedtransaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice himself, it isnot reasonable to expect that the Fiscal or the Court of First Instance of Manilawill take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for thedeal until and unless the Senate shall determined those parties are and shalltaken such measures as may be within its competence to take the redress thewrong that may have been committed against the people as a result of thetransaction. As we have said, the transaction involved no less than P5,000,000 ofpublic funds. That certainly is a matter of a public concern which it is the duty ofthe constitutional guardian of the treasury to investigate.

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range oflegitimate legislative inquiryand the proposed testimony of the witness calledrelates to that subject , obedience, to its process may be enforced by thecommittee by imprisonment. (Sullivanvs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79 S.E., 670; 40

Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)


39/322

The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied upon bythe petitioner, is not applicable here. In that case the inquiry instituted by theHouse of Representatives of the United States related to a private real-estatepool or partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay Cook and Company had hadan interest in the pool but become bankrupts, and their estate was in course ofadministration in a federal bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. The United Stateswas one of their creditors. The trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had effecteda settlement of the bankrupts' interest in the pool, and of course his action wassubject to examination and approval or disapproval by the bankruptcy court.Some of the creditors, including the United States, were dissatisfied with thesettlement. The resolution of the House directed the Committee "to inquire intothe nature and history of said real-estate pool and the character of saidsettlement, with the amount of property involve, in which Jay Cooke and Co.were interested, and the amount paid or to be paid in said settlement, with powerto send for persons and papers, and report to this House." The Supreme Court of

the United States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the resolutioncontained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; that the matter was one inrespect of which no valid legislation could be had; that the bankrupts' estate andthe trustee's settlement were still pending in the bankruptcy court; and that theUnited States and other creditors were free to press their claims in thatproceeding. And on these grounds the court held that in undertaking theinvestigation "the House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its ownauthority, but assumed a power which could only be properly exercised byanother branch of the government, because the power was in its nature clearly

judicial." The principles announced and applied in that case are: that neither

House of Congress possesses a "general power of making inquiry into theprivate affairs of the citizen"; that the power actually possessed is limited toinquires relating to matters of which the particular House has jurisdiction, and inrespect of which it rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry relates to amatter wherein relief or redress could be had only by judicial proceeding, it is notwithin the range of this power , but must be left to the court, conformably to theconstitutional separation of government powers.

That case differs from the present case in two important respects: (1) There thecourt found that the subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-estatepool or partnership, was not within the jurisdiction of either House of Congress;while here if it is not disputed that the subject of the inquiry, which relates to atransaction involving a questionable expenditure by the Government ofP5,000,000 of public funds, is within the jurisdiction of the Senate, (2) There theclaim of the Government as a creditor of Jay Cooke and Company, which hadhad an interest in the pool, was pending adjudication by the court; while here theinterposition of the judicial power on the subject of the inquiry cannot beexpected, as we have pointed out above, until after the Senate shall have


40/322

determined who the parties responsible are and shall have taken such measuresas may be within its competence to take to redress the wrong that may havebeen committed against the people as a result of the transaction.

It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Killbourn vs. Thompsonhas evoked strong criticisms from legal scholars. ( See Potts, Power of LegislativeBodies to Punish for Contempt [1926], 74 U. Pa. L. Rev., 692-699; James L.Land is, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power ofInvestigation [1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153, 154, 214-220.) We quoted thefollowing from Professor Land is' criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller saw the case purelyas an attempt by the House to secure to the Government certain priority rights ascreditor of the bankrupt concern. To him it assumed the character of a lawsuitbetween the Government and Jay Cooke and Co., with the Government, actingthrough the House, attempting to override the orderliness of establishedprocedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not before the courts but before

Congress. That bankruptcy proceedings had already been instituted against JayCooke and Co., in a federal court gave added impetus to such a conception. TheHouse was seeking to oust a court of prior acquired jurisdiction by anextraordinary and unwarranted assumption of "judicial power"! The broaderaspect of the investigation had not been disclosed to the Court. That Jay Cookeand Co.'s indebtedness and the particular funds in question were only part of thegreat administrative problem connected with the use and disposition of publicmonies, that the particular failure was of consequence mainly in relation to thesecurity demanded for all government deposits, that the facts connected with onesuch default revealed the possibility of other and greater maladministration, such

considerations had not been put before the Court. Nor had it been acquaintedwith the every-day nature of the particular investigation and the powers thereexerted by the House, powers whose exercise was customary and familiar inlegislative practice. Instead of assuming the character of an extraordinary judicialproceeding, the inquiry, place in its proper background, should have beenregarded as a normal and customary part of the legislative process. Detaileddefiniteness of legislative purpose was thus made the demand of the court inKillbournvs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the results that may beachieved. The power of Congress to exercise control over a real-estate pool isnot a matter for abstract speculation but one to be determined only after anexhaustive examination of the problem. Relationship, and not their possibilities,determine the extent of congressional power. Constitutionality depends uponsuch disclosures. Their presence, whether determinative of legislative or judicialpower, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor the Court canpredict, prior to the event, the result of the investigation."

The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S.,521; 61. ed., 881. The question there was whether the House of Representatives


41/322

exceeded its power in punishing, as for contempt of its authority, the District Attorney of the Southern District of New York, who had written, published, andsent to the chairman of one of its committees an ill-tempered and irritating letterrespecting the action and purposes of the committee in interfering with theinvestigation by the grand jury of alleged illegal activities of a member of theHouse of Representatives. Power to make inquires and obtain evidence bycompulsory process was not involved. The court recognized distinctly that theHouse of Representatives had implied power to punish a person not a memberfor contempt, but held that its action in this instance was without constitutional

justification. The decision was put on the ground that the letter, while offensiveand vexatious, was not calculated or likely to affect the House in any of itsproceedings or in the exercise of any of its functions. This brief statement of thefacts and the issues decided in that case is sufficient to show the inapplicabilitythereof to the present case. There the contempt involved consisted in the districtattorney's writing to the chairman of the committee an offensive and vexatious

letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the refusal of the witness toanswer questions pertinent to the subject of an inquiry which the Senate has thepower and jurisdiction to make . But in that case, it was recognized that theHouse of Representatives has implied power to punish a person not a member ofcontempt. In that respect the case is applicable here in favor of the Senate's (andnot of the Petitioner's ) contention.

Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority tocommit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, whichended on May 18, 1950. This contention is based on the opinion of Mr. Justice

Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and Villa-Real, in the case of Lopez vs.De los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that case it appears that on October 23,1929, Candido Lopez assaulted a member of the House of Representatives whilethe latter was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend thesession which was then about to begin, as a result of which assault saidrepresentative was unable to attend the sessions on that day and those of thetwo days next following by reason of the threats which Candido Lopez madeagainst him. By the resolution of the House adopted November 6, 1929, Lopezwas declared guilty of contempt of the House of Representatives and orderedpunished by confinement in Bilibid Prison for a period of twenty-four hours. Thatresolution was not complied with because the session of the House ofRepresentatives adjour

Consti Batch 5

Documents

Transcript of Consti Batch 5