Critica Al Impacto de Las Politicas de Construcciondepaz Liberal
Transcript of Critica Al Impacto de Las Politicas de Construcciondepaz Liberal
1
School of Social and International Studies
Department of Development and Economic Studies
2011/2012
Level: MA
Issues in Development Policy – ID 7017D
Semester Two
Course Coordinator: Behrooz Morvaridi
"Critically examine the impact of liberal
peacebuilding policies to the development of
war-torn societies"
Submitted by: 10003785
Turnitin paper ID: 17698384
Words: 3412
2
1. Introduction
For more than two decades, since the end of the Cold War, the world has been
witnessing the prevalence of a new type of conflict affecting the international
relations, followed by more than two decades of responses given by the international
community to the conflict-affected countries. Regardless of a considerable amount of
practice, these last twenty years of さpeace-orientedざ initiatives demonstrate how the
United Nations (UN) and donor agencies working in warfare countries worldwide are
still crawling to, as facilitators, enable these countries to create internal conditions for
a sustainable peace process, aミd to iマpleマeミt さlessoミs leaヴミedざ fヴoマ past
experiences.
This essay focuses specifically on the deficiencies of a certain part of the
iミteヴミatioミal Ioママuミit┞げs ヴespoミse to the war-torn societies, the peacebuilding
process, particularly its (neo)liberal orientation and (in)consequences to the
development1 of those societies. The first part briefly introduces the evolution of the
concept and practice of peacebuilding since the end of the 1980s, and the similarities
shared with the exported Western development model. The following section critically
analyses the inappropriateness of the "suggested" neoliberal policies down the throats
of countries emerging from conflict, and the consequent anomalous social dynamics
resulted from it – not much different from the ones produced by the Washington and
post-Washington Consensus, and structural adjustment processes in the developing
world in the late nineteenth-century.
The proposal is not to simply repeat the well-known critiques of neoliberalism
to the development of the so Ialled けfヴagile statesげ, Hut to highlight the counter-
productive insistency on a Western model proved flawed in non-conflicting societies,
let alone in the ones emerging from political, social and economic instability left by
civil wars. The theoretical debate is illustrated by two protracted peacebuilding
initiatives, in Afghanistan and East Timor2, selected considering the diversified nature
1 Although the Ioマple┝ities iミ┗ol┗iミg defiミitioミs foヴ de┗elopマeミt as a IoミIept, the さworking definitionざ
adopted is authorship of Morvaridi (2008): さthe progressive improvement in the social, economic well
being of people so that they live longer, healthier and fuller lives within any given political entityざ. 2 The country had its name changed to Timor Leste with its independence from Indonesia in 2002;
however, the term being used follows the practice of the author being referred to.
3
of each of the conflicts and political motivations behind Western involvement on
them3. Combining such conceptual discussion with the fore mentioned examples on
the ground aims to conclude that the liberal peacebuilding model, the methodology
used to implement it, and its harmful results are unhelpful to build the さsoIial
iミfヴastヴuItuヴe of peaIeざ ふBo┞Ie & OげDoミミel, ヲヰヰΑぶ in post-conflict societies, moreover
letting them in the verge of the resurgence of violence.
2. The liberal peacebuilding project
The dynamics of international relations and its actorsげ interaction have been
experiencing particular changes for the past twenty years. Previously, threats to
international security used to come from さpowerful aggressive statesざ (Newman, et al.,
2009, 9), with which it was necessary to be either ready to combat or align to. In the
さpost-Westphaliaミ eミ┗iヴoミマeミtざ, the failiミg oヴ IoミfliIt-prone states have been the
ones representing the most menace (ibid.), with which developed/threatened states
deマoミstヴate さIoopeヴatioミざ ┗ia peヴsoミミel IoミtヴiHutioミ ふtroops and civilians) and aid
assistance (agencies and investments) in peace operations4, in an attempt to
guarantee stabilization and their security5. It is in such scenario that the liberal
peacebuilding6 project is strengthened.
Furthermore, the increasingly common internal violence in such countries,
occurring between state and non state actors, targeting civilians, infrastructures and
livelihood systems, さeミduヴiミg I┞Iles of ┗ioleミIe aミd displaIeマeミtざ, HeIaマe さa
terminal threat to sustainable development (Duffield & Waddell, 2006, 6), in a period
3 The political motivation behind peacebuilding initiatives, or the political economy of peacebuilding, will
not be addressed throughout the paper, which does not intend to dismiss its fundamental role in the
subject. Because of the limited space of this paper, the focus chosen was some of the practical
development impacts of the peacebuilding policies in post-conflict societies. 4 Especially after 1988, マost of the UNげs opeヴatioミs foIused oミ the task of post-conflict peacebuilding
(Paris, 2004). 5 Mainly after the 9/11 attacks, the security concerns with civil wars in countries hosting terrorist groups
have been much alive behind peacebuilding initiatives. 6 The UN definition of peacebuilding is broad: "Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to
reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for
conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding
strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national
ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set
of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives." (UN, 2012; UN, 2012).
4
of intense discussions worldwide about the promotion of human security7 and the
responsibility to protect8. Thus, peacebuilding became an important vehicle to
さdeli┗eヴざ huマaミ seIuヴit┞ (Turner, et al., 2011), performing multiple tasks in societies
devastated by conflicts.
The current peacebuilding policies result, therefore, from a mixture of security
and development (Duffield & Waddell, 2006), in such order of priorities – which do not
reflect Galtuミgげs original proposal of assisting indigenous skills to manage peace and
resolve conflict, and liHeヴatiミg people fヴoマ さstヴuItuヴal ┗ioleミIeざ9 (Paris, 2004;
Peacebuilding and the United Nations, 2012). The failure to address the latter is the
focus of this paper.
The liberal peace project basically seeks to implement さdeマoIヴatizatioミ, ヴule of
la┘, huマaミ ヴights, Ii┗il soIiet┞, マaヴketizatioミ aミd de┗elopマeミtざ in war-torn societies,
Iヴeatiミg さsocial, economic, and political models (that) conform to a mixture of liberal
aミd ミeoliHeヴal iミteヴミatioミal e┝peItatioミs iミ a gloHalized aミd tヴaミsミatioミal settiミgざ
(Richmond, 2008, 187). To perform the tasks necessary to secure individuals, Boutros-
Ghali10
claimed for an international division of labor among NGOs, UN agencies, civil
society and states (Boutros-Ghali, 1995), resulting, in peacebuilding contexts, in the
International Financial Institutionsげ (IFIs) responsibility for economic matters, and UN
and other agenciesげ responsibility for political and security issues11
(Boyce & O'Donnell,
2007).
Regarding the role of the IFIs, in spite of the disastrous effects of the
conditionalities imposed to the so called Third World countries in the 70s and 80s,
7 According to the UNDP Human Development Report 1994, one of the documents responsible for the
iミtヴoduItioミ of the IoミIept iミ the UN ageミda, さThe IoミIept of huマaミ seIuヴit┞ stヴesses that people should be able to take care of themselves: all people should have the opportunity to meet their most
essential needs and to earn their own living. This will set them free and help ensure that they can make
a full contribution to development – their own development and that of their communities, their
Iouミtヴies aミd the ┘oヴld. Huマaミ “eIuヴit┞ is a IヴitiIal iミgヴedieミt of paヴtiIipatoヴ┞ de┗elopマeミt.げ ふUNDP, 1994, 24). 8 The concept Responsibility to Protect was created in 2001 with a report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State So┗eヴeigミt┞, aミd gi┗es a マoヴal dut┞ foヴ states to iミteヴ┗eミe さ┘heミ a state is uミaHle oヴ uミ┘illiミg to eミsuヴe the huマaミ seIuヴit┞ of its Iitizeミsざ (Duffield & Waddell, 2006, 9). 9 Galtung defines structural violence as aミ┞thiミg さaffeItiミg sustaiミaHle aミd positive peace, caused by
pooヴ eIoミoマiI aミd soIial Ioミditioミs, politiIal aミd eIoミoマiI iミstitutioミs, s┞steマs, oヴ stヴuItuヴesざ (Galtung, 1969 cited by Paris, 2004, 58). 10
Boutros-Ghali was the sixth Secretary-General of UN, between 1992 and 1996, and published the
document being referred to, the Agenda for Peace, in 1995. 11
Such division between economic and political processes has been one of the critiques of the model,
which will be further addressed in the next section.
5
Pugh states that さThe old-style unthinking Washington consensus about development
may be merely a virtual death, with a liberal peace redivivus eマeヴgiミg fヴoマ the ashesざ
(2005, 6). In the beginning of the 90s, the rules for war-toヴミ soIietiesげ loaミs ┘ith
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank12
consisted on the same that
used to be applied, such as fiscal and monetary austerity measures, low public
expenditure, limited provision of credit and devaluation of local currency, envisioning
low inflation rates, macroeconomic balance, privatization, liberalization of trade and
deregulation of financial and labor markets (Paris, 2004). By the end of the 90s, good
go┗eヴミaミIe, さ┗oiIeざ aミd partnership were added to the post-Washington Consensus
list (ibid.; Maxwell, 2005), covering even more the ticking boxes of the western liberal
democracy.
Many critiques of the neoliberal development project of peacebuilding have, to
a certain extent, succeded in bringing a さreformulationざ, at least in the discourse, of
the liberal peace project in recent years. The aIIeptaミIe of the fla┘ed さiミstitutioミall┞
oriented, neoliberally aimed and constructed around the elite governance of conflict
zoミesざ liHeral peace model (Richmond & Franks, 2008, 187) has encouraged pressure
for fair trade, accomplishment of Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), lessening
debt, advocacy for social protection and negligence of aid conditionality (Pugh, 2005).
Theヴe has also Heeミ a ミe┘ さIoミfliIt iマpaIt assessマeミtざ into decision-making at
official development agencies (Boyce & O'Donnell, 2007, 9), and the creation of the
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and UN Peacebuilding Support Office, in order to
さiミstitutioミalize lessoミs leaヴミedざ aミd pヴoマote duヴaHle peaIe iミ post-conflict regions
ふPugh, ヲヰヰヵぶ. Noミetheless, aIIoヴdiミg to Bo┞Ie & OげDoミミell ふop Iitぶ, さIoミfliIt iマpaIt
assessマeミtざ applied to revenue policies, for example, さis still in its infancyざ and the
PBC, instead of reporting to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and General
Assembly, does it to the power-disputed Security Council, and induces early
involvement of IFIs in peace process, reinforcing even more the liberal ideology and
practice (Pugh, 2005).
The liberal peace project has been institutionalized to the extent that most of
the human rights, development and emergency relief agencies on the ground accept
12
According to Paris (2004), the World Bank started to impose conditionalities to its loans in the 80s
only.
6
its ideals as the さdesiヴaHle oHjeIti┗es foヴ de┗elopiミg statesざ ふPaヴis, ヲヰヰヴぶ. Pugh argues
that the さヴefoヴマsざ pヴoposed – H┞ ミoミe otheヴ thaミ the さlifeguaヴdsざ of Iapitalisマ13 – are
better described by the teヴマ さliddisマざ14, which do not represent, therefore, the
necessary paradigm shift for the emergence of real emancipatory and sustainable
peace processes in post-conflict realities (Pugh, et al., 2008, 395).
3. The (lack of) developmental role of the liberal peacebuilding project
Although the reasonable years of experiences and failures of the broad and
ambitious liberal peacebuilding project, it continues to be implemented –
Ioマpleマeミted H┞ the ミe┘ さ┗aluesざ stated eaヴlieヴ – promising to establish market
democracies which promote human rights and civil peace (Richmond, 2006). However,
the fruits harvested by the recipient societies are most frequently state and
iミstitutioミsげ ┘eakミess, uミeマplo┞マeミt aミd laIk of de┗elopマeミt (ibid.), not much
different from what developing countries had experienced in the late nineteenth
century. Paddy Ashdown15
appropriately addressed such malfunction:
さIヴoミiIall┞, as a politiIiaミ I Iaマpaigミed agaiミst マaミ┞ of heヴ [ThatIheヴげs] ヴefoヴマs, aヴguiミg that the┞ ┘ould lead to lost jobs and the selling off of the national wealth; only to find
myself instituting very similar reforms in Bosnia and facing the
same arguments and opposition. What makes matters worse
in most post-conflict countries is that they are poor, not rich –
so the pain can be far greater. There is not much the
interveners can do about this, except understand it and
recognize that by insisting on accelerated reforms we are
often asking local politicians to take responsibility for a level of
social disruption which our own politicians at home would
ヴejeIt ┘ithout a seIoミd thoughtざ (Ashdown, 2007 cited by
Cooper, et al., 2011, 7)
Several arguments can be derived from his words. The most evident relates to
the fast-speed political and economic changes requested by intervenors, whose
13
Oミe e┝aマple is Jeffヴe┞ “aIhs, eaヴlieヴ ヴespoミsiHle foヴ the stヴuItuヴal adjustマeミt aミd さshoヴt shaヴp shoIk tヴeatマeミtざ, aミd lateヴ aヴIhiteIt of the Ioマpilation of the Millenium Declaration into MDGs. The latter is
filled ┘ith liHeヴal assuマptioミs, suIh as さoミe-size-fits-allざ to taIkle e┝tヴeマe po┗eヴt┞, puHliI iミ┗estマeミt for private purposes, and absence of state dirigisme in integration to the global trade (Pugh, 2005, 7). 14
さLiddisマざ, a term designed by Paul Rogers, means keeping a lid on disorder (Rogers, 2000). 15
Padd┞ Ashdo┘ミ ┘as a MeマHeヴ of Paヴliaマeミt duヴiミg Maヴgaヴet TatIheヴげs adマiミistヴatioミ, aミd lateヴ (2002-2006) the High Representative of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
7
impacts the governments, when existent, are not able to absorb. Furthermore, Chua
states that さat ミo poiミt iミ histoヴ┞ did any Western nation ever implemented laissez-
faire capitalism and overnight universal suffrage at the saマe tiマeざ ふヲヰヰヴ, ヱヴぶ.
Similarly, widespread privatization, especially in social services, does not seem suitable
where even basic services are not delivered (Pugh, 2005).
Aミotheヴ iteマ deヴi┗ed fヴoマ Ashdo┘ミげs stateマeミt ヴegaヴds the sepaヴatioミ
between economics and politics/social values in peacebuilding strategies, which Cox
(1992) cited by Pugh (2005, 9ぶ Ialls さde-politization of eIoミoマiI issuesざ. Hazaヴdous
effects are generated in post-conflict societies as a result of the absence of a holistic
approach to deal with their complexities, which is also a reflect of the lack of synergy
between, for example, the British Department for International Development (DFID)
aミd that Iouミtヴ┞げs Depaヴtマeミt of Tヴade aミd Iミdustヴ┞ in dealing with their aid recipient
countries (Collier, 2007). As declared by Ashdown, reforms instituted by intervenors in
post-conflict realities such as removal of barriers for free trade are still rejected by
their own politicians at home, where the rule is that integration to global markets is
followed by growth, which is followed by protectionism in order to safeguard critical
economic interests in the promotion of freer trade (Pugh, 2005). DIFD efforts in the
development of war-torn societies would be much more effective if it had a voice in
the British industrial and trade sectors.
Ha┗iミg said that, oミe last issue IoミミeIted to Ashdo┘ミげs ケuote is the ヴole of the
state in the post-conflict economy. Beyond imposing trade barriers and protecting
national industries, it is the primary responsibility of governments to invest and
provide public goods and services, create employment, reduce the shadow economy,
and most importantly, さヴedヴess hoヴizoミtal aミd ┗eヴtiIal iミeケualities that aヴe iマpliIated
iミ ┗ioleミt IoミfliItざ, ミeIessaヴ┞ foヴ the さsoIial iミfヴastヴuItuヴe of peaIeざ (Turner, 2006;
Boyce & O'Donnell, 2007, 9). Private-sector markets are far from adjusting such
inequalities automatically, as advocated by neoliberal policies, and which had been
proven by the experience of developing countries – not emerging from conflict – in the
past two decades.
The peacebuilding policies demonstrate a major concern with the (re)creation
of a state capable of implementing the rule of law dictated by externals, usually to be
implemented by ruling local elites, in order to regulate a turbulent environment. The
8
establishment of a functioning society, with a sustainable economic process capable of
generating employment and a welfare system (Richmond, 2006), with the participation
of its people, although gradually incorporated in policy documents, is far from being
set as priority by doミoヴsげ pヴaItiIes. An example on the ground was the imposition of
the foreign centralized judicial system and さミe┘ざ rule of law in East Timor, in conflict
┘ith loIal さsuIo ふ┗illageぶ aミd tヴiHal la┘ざ, which has caused troubles with compliance
and police training in the country (Richmond & Franks, 2008, 195).
Regarding the welfare16
systems of those societies, some are the reasons for
their hindrance. First of all, the wealth creation system is not only imposed from the
さforeign aboveざ, but it is also likel┞ to He マaミaged H┞ elites さthat IoミduIted IoミfliIt iミ
fiヴst plaIeざ, iミteミsif┞iミg さthe soIiall┞ di┗isi┗e, atoマiziミg effeIts of IoミfliIt – capital
accumulation by dispossession, reorientations of patronage and fragmentation of
authoヴit┞ざ ふibid., 296; 83). The absence of locals in leading the political and economic
course of their own societies, marginalising their understanding of peace and well-
being, and not addressing their needs (Newman et al., 2009; Richmond, 2008), leads to
a fiscal dilemma: none or few services delivered to the peoples, results in their
proportionate will to pay taxes, which affects not only the governnemnt revenues but
also its legitimacy (Boyce & O'Donnell, 2007).
Secondly, amid such environment of unsustainable market-oriented economic
reconstruction delegated to a minority – which Amy Chua contends as the recipe for
group hatred and ethnic violence17
– and with no viable alternative livelihoods, the
shadow economy is frequently considered a possibility (Cooper & Pugh, 2004). That is
very much the case in Afghanistan, where the drug economy, which figures as a
historical aspect of the country, さis the ミeaヴest thiミg to a ミatioミal seItoヴざ aミd Βヰ-90
peヴIeミt of the eIoミoマ┞ is さiミfoヴマal, desIeミtヴalized … aミd fヴagマeミtedざ (Goodhand &
Sedra, 2010). The iミteヴミatioミal pヴoIess of aidiミg the Iouミtヴ┞げs ヴeIoミstヴuItioミ has not
pヴopeヴl┞ Ioミsideヴed the さIoミte┝t of Afghaミ histoヴ┞ aミd soIial ヴelatioミsざ by considering
activities of the organized crime and informal economies as obstacles for the state-
building process, and enforcing the rule of law in an attempt to restrain them
16
Refraining from a theoretical debate about the concept, in will be simply considered さiミdi┗idual aミd community fostered well-Heiミgざ ふNe┘マaミ, et al., ヲヰヰΓ, Βヰぶ. 17
さMaヴkets IoミIeミtヴate eミoヴマous ┘ealth in the hands of an さoutsideヴざ minority, fomenting ethnic envy
aミd hatヴed aマoミg ofteミ IhヴoミiIall┞ pooヴ マajoヴitiesざ ふChua, ヲヰヰヴ, Γぶ.
9
(Goodhand, 2004). There is a need, instead, of engaging with the さillegalざ
entrepreneurs to support them channel their profits to investment in the not-so-
attractive licit economy (ibid.). According to Newman,
さDisマissal of all elements of informal welfare
pヴaItiIed iミ the さtヴiIks of lifeざ – as socially corrosive and
leading to moral collapse – is to misunderstand the need for
social cement in everyday life where social corrosion is
engendered by increasing disparities of wealth under
liHeヴalizatioミざ (Newman, et al., 2009, 88).
A number of neoliberals even dare to affirm that ┘elfaヴe is a さdisiミIeミti┗e to
iミ┗estマeミt aミd ┘oヴk, aミd Iヴeate depeミdeミIeざ ふOffe, ヱΓΒヲ Iited H┞ ‘iIhマoミd, ヲヰヰΒ,
293). They do not mention, however, the dependency created by the external
presence in countries hosting peacebuilding missions which are liteヴall┞ さdeli┗eヴedざ to
post-conflict societies by an externally designed agenda, enabled by foreign aid, and
implemented by international workers. The main aspects of the さhoヴミHookざ were
previously explored; the impacts of international financial assistance and human
resources also deserve some considerations.
The importance of aid in reconstructing countries emerging from conflict
should not be undermined. Nevertheless, the relatively high amounts flowing into the
economy possibly represents: a) a discouragement for raising domestic revenues
through collecting taxes; b) an overloading of the already restrictive stateげs aHilit┞ さto
disburse funds in a timel┞ aミd tヴaミspaヴeミt fashioミざ; c) a hindrance in Huildiミg さstate
IapaIit┞ iミ Hudget alloIatioミ aミd e┝peミdituヴe マaミageマeミtざ, oミIe aid is マaiミl┞
conducted via private actors and NGOs (Boyce & O'Donnell, 2007, 10). As a result,
several authors mention the creation of a dual public sector one managed by the
government, and the other managed and funded by donors (Goodhand, 2004;
Ishizuka, 2008).
Furthermore, the previously mentioned imposition of conditions à la Bretton
Woods by donor agencies and countries in order to continue delivery of aid, such as
good governance, マo┗es the ミatioミal ageミda a┘a┞ fヴoマ さloIal ミeeds aミd aspiヴatioミsざ
(Newman, 2009, 11), iマpediミg the Iヴeatioミ of さa soIial IoミtヴaIt Het┘eeミ Iitizeミs aミd
institutioミs that Iitizeミs peヴIei┗e as legitiマateざ (Richmond & Franks, 2008, 198),
undermining even more the strengthening of the state.
10
In East Timor, the dual and external-interest driven economy is appropriately
represented by the American management of revenues from the Timorese oil and gas
reserves. The country has contracts with Australia and international energy
organizations, but the oil funds flow through the US central bank in order to avoid
corruption by the Timorese government. According to Richmond (2008), corruption
actually occurs on the side of those さa┗oidiミgざ it, as Americans work with Fretilin18
to
oppose to the Iouミtヴ┞げs go┗eヴミマeミt.
Iミ the Afghaミ Ioミte┝t, H┞ ヲヰヰヴ, ヵヰ peヴIeミt of the Iouミtヴ┞げs GDP Ioミsisted oミ
aid, and one third of the total amount that had been aided to Afghanistan since 2001
had come from USA (Goodhand, 2004). Thus, the priority had been given to military
and security sector reform, creating such a structure – especially oriented by the short
term objectives of counter-insurgency operations – that the government will not be
aHle to sustaiミ iミ the loミg teヴマ さe┗eミ ┘ith the マost optiマistiI ヴe┗eミue pヴojeItioミsざ
(ibid., 88). The apparently aspiration of Afghans for a strong and centralized state
capable of providing a functioning legal system and stability is disregarded, which runs
the ヴisk of tヴaミsfoヴマiミg a さIヴiマiミalized ┘aヴ eIoミoマ┞ざ iミ a さIヴiマiミalized peaIe
eIoミoマ┞ざ ふiHid., 76).
‘egaヴdiミg iミteヴミatioミal ┘oヴkeヴsげ iミ┗ol┗eマeミt iミ Iouミtヴies hostiミg
peacebuilding missions – most of them coming from developed realities –, or local
employees by UN or international NGOs, two issues deserve considerable concern.
Firstly, the consuming habits of expatriate workers induces the development of a
parallel economy consisted by overpriced hotels, cafes, restaurants and supermarkets,
only afforded by those earning an international salary (Ishizuka, 2008). In East Timor,
suIh さdispla┞ of afflueミIe aマid the po┗eヴt┞, destヴuItioミ aミd uミeマplo┞マeミt ┘hiIh
IhaヴaIteヴized the loIal eIoミoマ┞ ┘as aミ affヴoミtざ (Overseas Development Institute,
2002 cited by Ishizuka, 2008, 55).
Second, the employment of local people by external organizations have two
side effects in the economy dynamics: their better working conditions and salaries
iミduIe a さHヴaiミ dヴaiミざ fヴoマ state iミstitutioミs aミd Ioママuミit┞ Hased oヴgaミizatioミs, aミd
such international salary stimulates inflation on price le┗els, さdepヴessiミg the ┗alue of
18
Fretilin is the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, the opposition party to the
government of East Timor.
11
state salariesざ ふGoodhaミd, ヲヰヰヴ, Γヰぶ. In Afghanistan those effects reverberated in the
national economy by the forty thousand locals employed by international
organizations, who were characterized H┞ Afghaミs as the さIo┘s that drink their own
マilkざ (ibid., 94). Likewise, in East Timor there was a widespread national sentiment
that さTiマoヴese HeIaマe the seヴ┗aミts of iミteヴミatioミal aid ┘oヴkeヴs iミ theiヴ o┘ミ Iouミtヴ┞ざ
(Ishizuka, 2008, 54).
The highlighted issues herein are far from covering the whole range of impacts
caused by the current liberal peacebuilding project in the reconstruction and
development of post-conflict societies. However, it intended to demonstrate how
さE┗eヴ┞da┞ life does ミot Ioミfoヴマ to the ヴatioミalisマ of the eIoミomic engineers from
outsideざ (Newman, et al., 2009, 87), and the real impacts of their magic-formulas on
the ground, already known by previous neoliberal development initiatives. It is more
adeケuate to sa┞ that these soIietiesげ ┘elfaヴe is aヴヴaミged despite the international
assistance and not because of it (ibid.). The reasons for insisting in the same mistakes
from past experiences are subject for another essay.
4. Conclusion
The liberal peacebuilding and the amendments it has undergone throughout
the past two decades is paralleled to the changes occurred in the development model
being implemented in less developed regions by international organizations and donor
agencies. The financial crisis of 2008 has once again demonstrated that the American
さマagiI foヴマulaざ of ミeoliHeヴal マaヴket-democracies, especially in a deliberatively
liberalized capital market environment, can bring catastrophic consequences to the
societies well-being (Birdsall & Fukuyama, 2011). The need for social protection and a
sequencing liberalization process19
have been proposed and implemented in countries
such as Brazil and Mexico, but have not yet reached peacebuilding (ibid.), what this
piece of work has attempted to demonstrate.
The analogy made between the concepts and practices of the liberal
peacebuilding and the development models stresses how unproductive and even
19
Sequencing liberalization means liberalizing only after a strong regulatory system has been in place
(Birdsall & Fukuyama, 2011).
12
counter-productive it is to continue implementing such a さpackageざ, which has
historically caused serious political, economic and social damages to the developing
world, in societies destroyed by civil wars. Some of those damages caused by the
peacebuilding experiences in East Timor and Afghanistan, which have been in place
throughout the past decade, illustrated that.
Furthermore, considering the fragile aspects of the post-conflict realities, the
iマpaIts of the Iuヴヴeミt peaIeHuildiミg pヴogヴaママes マa┞ easil┞ e┝aIeヴHate さthe soIial
tensions that resulted in violeミt IoミfliIt iミ the fiヴst plaIeざ, ミot IoミtヴiHutiミg, theヴefoヴe,
for the sustainable peace envisioned (Newman, et al., 2009, 13). Quoting Birdsall &
Fukuyama, and correlating peace and development, さde┗elopマeミt has ミe┗eヴ Heeミ
something that the rich bestowed on the poor but rather something the poor achieved
for themselvesざ ふヲヰヱヱ, ヵンぶ. As well as for development, for a peace process to be
durable it must involve the welfare dynamics and culture of the peoples affected, who
must be the protagonists of their own emancipation. Such message is made clear in
the following statement by Xamana Gusmão, current Prime Minister of East Timor,
さWe aヴe ミot iミteヴested iミ a legaI┞ of Iaヴs aミd la┘s, nor are we interested in a legacy of development plans for the
future designed by [people] other than East Timorese. We are
not interested in inheriting an economic rationale which
leaves out the social and political complexity of East Timorese
reality. Nor do we wish to inherit the heavy decision-making
and project implementation mechanisms in which the role of
the East Timorese is to give their consent as observers rather
than the active players we should start to beざ (Dodd, 2000,
183).
13
5. Bibliography
Birdsall, N. & Fukuyama, F., 2011. The Post-Washington Consensus: Development After
the Crisis. Foreign Affairs, March/April, 90(2), pp. 45-53.
Boutros-Ghali, B., 1995. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping (17 June 1992), New York: United Nations.
Boyce, J. & O'Donnell, M., 2007. Peace and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for
Postwar Statebuilding. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Candio, P. & Bleiker, P., 2001. Peacebuilding in East Timor. The Pacific Review, 14(1),
pp. 63-84.
Chua, A., 2004. World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic
Hatred and Global Instability. Westminster: Knopf Publishing Group.
Collier, P., 2007. The bottom billiom: why the poorest countries are failing and what
can be done about it. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cooper, N., 2007. Review article: On the crisis of the liberal peace. Conflict, Security
and Development, December, 7(4), pp. 605-616.
Cooper, N. & Pugh, M., 2004. War economies in regional context: Challenges of
Transformation. London: Lynne Rienner.
Cooper, N., Turner, M. & Pugh, M., 2011. The end of history and the last liberal
peacebuilder: a reply to Roland Paris. Review of International Studies, October, 37(4),
pp. 1995-2007.
Dodd, M., 2000. Give us a say, urges Gusmão. The age, 10 October.
Duffield, M. & Waddell, N., 2006. Securing Humans in a Dangerous World.
International Politics, Volume 46, pp. 1-26.
Goodhand, J., 2004. Afghanistan in Central Asia. In: War Economies in a Regional
Context: Challenges of Transformation. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 45-89.
Goodhand, J. & Sedra, M., 2010. Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction, and
peacebuilding in Afghanistan. Disasters, 34(1), pp. 78-102.
Ishizuka, K., 2008. Peacekeeping in East-Timor: The Experience of UNMISET.
International Peacekeeping, 10(3), pp. 44-59.
Maxwell, S., 2005. London: Overseas Development Institute.
14
Morvaridi, B., 2008. What is development? Bradford: University of Bradford.
Newman, E., 2009. "Liberal" Peacebuilding Debates. In: New Perspectives on Liberal
Peacebuilding. New York: United Nations University Press, pp. 26-53.
Newman, E., Paris, R. & Richmond, O., 2009. New Perspectives on Liberal
Peacebuilding. New York: United Nations University Press.
Paris, R., 2004. At War's End: Building Peace After the Civil Conflict. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Paris, R., 2010. Saving Liberal Peacebuilding. Review of International Studies, Volume
36, pp. 337-365.
Pugh, M., 2005. The Political Economy of Peacebuilding. International Journal of Peace
Studies, 10(5), pp. 23-42.
Pugh, M., 2009. Towards Life Welfare. In:: New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding.
New York: United Nations University Press, pp. 78-96.
Pugh, M., Turner, M. & Cooper, N., 2008. Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the
Political Economy of Peacebuilding. London: Palgrave.
Ratner, S., 1995. The new UN peacekeeping: building peace in lands of conflict after the
Cold War. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Richmond, O., 2006. The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace'. Conflict,
Security and Development, October, 6(3), pp. 291-314.
Richmond, O., 2008. Welfare and the Civil Peace: Poverty with Rights?. In: Whose
Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding. London:
Palgrave, pp. 289-303.
Richmond, O. & Franks, J., 2008. Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The Emperor's
New Clothes. International Peacekeeping, 15(2), pp. 185-200.
Rogers, P., 2000. Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century. London: Pluto
Press.
Turner, M., Pugh, M. & Cooper, N., 2011. Institutionalized and co-opted: why human
security has lost its way. In: Critical Perspectives on Human Security: rethinking
emancipation and power in international relations. London: Routledge, pp. 83-96.
UN, 2012. Peacebuilding and the United Nations. [Online] Available at:
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pbun.shtml [Accessed 28 May 2012].