Futbol Club Barcelona Molt més que un club

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PROJECT FOR: BUSINESS ECONOMICS II Futbol Club Barcelona Molt més que un club Eduard Llaguno Roger Cuscó Altair Ciurans Business Economics II Professor: David Rodríguez 03/15/2010

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PROJECT FOR: BUSINESS ECONOMICS IIEduard LlagunoRoger CuscóAltair CiuransBusiness Economics IIProfessor: David Rodríguez03/15/2010

Transcript of Futbol Club Barcelona Molt més que un club

Page 1: Futbol Club Barcelona Molt més que un club

PROJECT FOR: BUSINESS ECONOMICS II

Futbol Club Barcelona Molt més que un club

Eduard Llaguno

Roger Cuscó

Altair Ciurans

Business Economics II

Professor: David Rodríguez

03/15/2010

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1. Why FC Barcelona? …………………………………………….…………………………………………. 3

2. Introduction to FC Barcelona ………………………………………….………..…………………… 4

3. Futbol Club Barcelona Strategy …………………………………………………………………….. 5

3.1 FC Barcelona economic strategy………………………………………………..………….. 5

3.2 Football strategy …………………………………………………………………….…………….. 7

3.3 International focus ………………………………………..…………….……………………….. 9

3.4 Sport deparments ………………………………………..…………………………………..….. 11

3.4.1 “Futbol Base” ………………………………………..……………………………….. 11

3.4.2 Basketball ………………………………………..………………………………….….. 12

3.5 “More than a club” ………………………………………..…………………………………….. 13

4. Profitability ………………………………………..…………….…………………...………………….. 14

5. Conclusion………………………………………..………………………….…..……………………….. 18

6. Bibliography ………………………………………..……………………………..…………………….. 19

Annex 1: Interview………………………………………..…………………………………….…..……….. 20

Annex 2: Survey results………………………………………..…………………………………….…….. 25

Annex 3: Economic results ………………………………………..……………………………………... 33

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1. Why FC Barcelona?

FC Barcelona is much more than a football club, it is an institution, with a combination of

values and ideas to which many people feel identified with. Millions of people all over the

globe know or admire FC Barcelona. One of the things that most astonished us about FC

Barcelona was that it was attaining incredible economics results while the rest of the economy

still is under a severe recession. Even more, the club itself as well as its revenues have

exponentially grown over the past 6 years. At that time FC Barcelona had losses of 140 M€ and

was at the very edge of bankruptcy.

Another aspect which we found interesting was its other sport departments and the terrible

economic results they were having, despite those losses FC Barcelona departments win most

of the competitions they participate in. Then the dilemma appears: Why should FC Barcelona

hold to departments that are clear economical drawback? Is there any strategic reason on

doing that?

In order to solve all those questions we have proceeded to analyse FC Barcelona’s strategy,

how it creates value, what the economic results have been as well as the opinion of the club

members. FC Barcelona is a very special case, bearing in mind that its club members are also

the owners of the club it is extremely important to know what their anxieties and opinions are.

We also interviewed Joan Oliver who is FC Barcelona’s current executive director, from who

we got extremely relevant information for our project as well as a new approach to the

concept of “more than a club” that FC Barcelona is trying to implement worldwide.

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2. INTRODUCTION TO FC BARCELONA

On November 29, 1899, Hans Gamper founded Futbol Club Barcelona, along with eleven other

enthusiasts of 'foot-ball', a game that was still largely unknown in this part of the world.

He could never have imagined the magnitude of what that initiative would eventually develop

into. Over more than one hundred years of history, FC Barcelona has grown spectacularly in

every area and has progressed into something much greater than a mere sports club, turning

Barça’s ‘more than a club’ slogan into a reality.

Barça has become, for millions of people all around the world, a symbol of their identity, and

not just in a sporting sense, but also in terms of society, politics and culture. Throughout the

most difficult of times, Barça was the standard that represented Catalonia and the Catalan

people's desire for freedom, a symbolism that has continued to be closely linked to the

idiosyncrasy of the Club and its members to this day. Within the context of Spain, Barça is seen

as an open and democratic club. And all around the world, Barça is identified with caring

causes, and most especially children through its sponsorship agreement with Unicef.

For a whole century, FC Barcelona has passed through moments of glory and pain, periods of

brilliance and other less successful ones, epic victories and humbling defeats. But all these

different moments have helped define the personality of a Club that, due to its peculiar

nature, is considered unique in the world.

With over one hundred years of history, there have naturally been many different periods,

both in a social and a sporting sense. In the early years (1899-1922) , from the foundation of

the club to the construction of Les Corts stadium, Barça was a club that had to distinguish itself

from all the other football teams in Barcelona, to the point that it would come to be identified

with the city as a whole. Barça soon became the leading club in Catalonia, and also associated

itself with the increasingly growing sense of Catalan national identity.

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3. Futbol Club Barcelona Strategy

3.1 FC BARCELONA ECONOMIC STRATEGY

FC Barcelona economic strategy, like all of the other professional clubs, has substantially

changed during the past years. An increasing professionalization within the sector and the

expansion of its commercial activities has turned football clubs into highly competitive

organizations. The sell of TV rights has allowed very high volume of revenues compared to the

ticket ones, a more traditional sort of revenue. At the same time the start of the exploitation

of the TV rights has allowed marketing campaigns to be much more aggressive, with all sorts of

commercial activities such as sponsors, adverts, etc. The distribution of revenues among

commercial activities (a), ticket sells (b) and that of TV rights (c) is widely different depending

on the club or league on which teams play. For instance, in the Fußball-Bundesliga the main

source of revenues are comercial activities. Italian clubs work on a TV rights base of revenues

whilst English ones have a more gentle and even distribution among the three.

FC Barcelona strategic model is much more alike the English system, but in general Spanish

clubs do not share any specific or unique distribution of revenues. Real Madrid CF tends to

finance itself most on a commercial basis. In the following table you can identify the odds and

twists of every model we have said.

Table X: Distribution of different European clubs revenues.

Team Commercial (%) Tickets (%) TV right (%)

F.C.Barcelona 34 30 36

Chelsea 28 38 34

Bayern Munich 54 25 21

Real Madrid 43 26 31

AC Milan 23 13 64

* Revenue percentages of 2007, elaborated from Deloitte, «Football Money League: changing the guard», 2006.

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FC Barcelona as a brand name has spent the last 7 years trying to intensify its process of

internationalization with tours in the USA and Asia. From these tours FC Barcelona is able to

get highly advantageous contracts for marketing, TV rights and sponsors of all kinds. These

markets are very attractive as they do not have a city related club, therefore they are more

likely to be seduced by other clubs such as FC Barcelona. Hence a competition among clubs is

created in order to gain those new markets with high potential of revenues. In 2003 Joan

Laporta’s board of directors established a set of directives in order to associate the club with

international companies. They consisted on the division of the sponsors in three categories:

principal, official and supplier.

Another important fact to bear in mind is the collaboration with charities like UNICEF for which

FC Barcelona is allowed to wear its name on the shirts. These measures suppose a loss in strict

economic terms, however, they significantly improve the club’s image and in the long term the

benefits of having a social caring brand name make revenues rise much higher than they would

otherwise have been. All this commercial activities come from a single strategic model, Joan

Oliver: “FC Barcelona, nowadays, has stopped being local but global”. In order to give more

value to the brand name its General Manager has set up an innovative strategy based on

qualitative differentiation. Other than Catalan national feelings and the cooperation with

UNICEF’s project FC Barcelona also has many other sport departments the intention of which is

to outstand in every single tournament so that the image of a champion team is even more

consolidated. These departments are economically damaging to the club but add a value to FC

Barcelona that other clubs cannot afford to have.

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3.2 FOOTBALL STRATEGY UNDER JOAN LAPORTA’S PRESIDENCY 2003-2010

Late football strategy has been based on three main pillars: buying players’ policy, style of

game, and the competition’s successes.

Nowadays 40% of the players that have come out of FCB’s school and that play in the Spanish

league currently participate in FCB’s first team (11 out of 28). This is a highly remarkable fact

that shows the very intention of getting a high degree of vertical integration in the production

of football players within the club. Last year’s FIFA ranking was as follows: 1st Lionel Messi, 2nd

Cristiano Ronaldo, 3rd Xavier Hernandez, 4th Kaka, 5th Andrés Iniesta. As you can see 3 out of

the 5 best players in the world currently play in FCB and have been trained in its school. These

3 players are valued in 380 million Euros (in case someone wants to buy them before their

contract with the club ends), this value has been created in the club itself, hence it has carried

no extra cost to the club’s financial burden.

FCB’s first team has a very particular style of playing football, it is based on a high possession

of the ball and in its fast display. The very objective of this tactic is to destabilize the opponent

and make it very hard to their strikers to have as many opportunities as they would enjoy

playing against a more conservative team. The display of the team in the field is very advanced

with respect to others hence it is of vital importance that FCB guarantees that such a key area

like the mid-field is held with players of great quality and a very fine knowledge of the tactics

being used. Xavier Hernandez and Andrés Iniesta have been brought up in FCB’s style and

perfectly suit the profile that the team needs at that key position. The fact that they must be

able to turn around an opponent’s offensive strike, very dangerous to FCB if it is of a fast

counter-attack nature, into an own offensive strike makes all the difference in becoming the

best club in the world or just a mere noble try that could have but unfortunately did not

succeed.The high possession of the ball provides the strikers with many chances to score,

which is even further enhanced by having players of the quality of Lionel Messi, Pedro, Bojan,

Henry or Ronaldinho (in previous seasons). Ball’s possession is usually above 55% and most of

the game is played in the opponent’s part of the field (in the Spanish league).

As we have been discussing the mid-field position is key to the tactics, so we find that the

defenders have a bit more of a role in supporting the mid-fielders than in actually defending

there positions with strict rigidity. FCB’s goalkeeper is not quite active in a normal match

although it proves itself vital when the action of the rest of the team has failed. Eventually we

could argue that such a risky strategy makes Barça get many opponent’s goals , but data like

the “Copa del Rei” (equivalent to the FA Cup) with 9 goals for and 3 goals against seem to

agree that previous assessment was on the right direction. However, having lost the chance to

win this year’s Cup against Seville a ratio of 3:1 goals is still highly encouraging although may

not be always determinant.

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Liverpool, the English football club, has shown interest in FCB’s strategy and has already

started to introduce some of its tactics to their own football school. This highly innovative style

that has taken the world’s breath in terms of football has got to a point that now some football

experts (coaches and managers) agree to say that in about 10 years time most of the world

teams will play in the same fashion that FCB does now.

Cal dir també que altres equips com el Liverpool s’han interessat pel joc del Barça i han

començat a moure fils perquè el seu filial comenci a fer el mateix joc que el primer equip del

Barça. El joc innovador del FCB ha meravellat mig món fins al punt que hi ha gent que

sentencia que el joc actual del Barça serà el joc predominant als camps de futbol mundials

d’aquí a 10 anys.

FCB’s first team has during the last 7 years attained: 3 Spanish leagues, 2 Champion’s, 1

World’s club league, 1 Copa del Rei, 1 Super cup of Spain and 1 Super cup of Europe. This

means 9 bright successes in just 7 years, a result that seems to encourage a continuation and

further expansion of today’s football strategy.

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3.3 INTERNATIONAL FOCUS

FC Barcelona’s international area is a strategic key issue for the club and a source of revenues

in continuous expansion. The great level of football that the first team showed last season has

attracted even more worldwide companies and institutions that want to attach Barcelona’s

triumphal image to their respective entities.

The USA is consolidating as a priority region for FC Barcelona’s strategy. Needless to say the

USA is the market where sponsoring is more common and socially accepted, the idea of the

club managers is to attract those potential sponsors to the club in a short period of time. Last

season a collaboration contract was signed between the MLS, American league of professional

football, and FC Barcelona in order to let the image of the club spread all over the USA and

also to promote this sport in the country. Other regions like UAE (United Arab Emirates),

Japan, South Korea and all those countries with a high potential of growth such as China, India

are strategic key points for the success of FC Barcelona’s international expansion.

- “Patrocinis internacionals/regionals”:

Interest from international sponsors to link their image to that of FC Barcelona is

growing faster every year. A very good example is that last season FC Barcelona and

the mobile services company Etisalat closed a deal consisting on a 4 years contract and

3 M€ per year in order to sponsor FC Barcelona. Other than that Etisalat will also be

contributing to FC Barcelona’s foundation with an annual donation of 250.000€.

Turkish airlines also signed a contract valued in 2 annual million €. These two contracts

will substitute those of Telefonica and Vueling both Spanish companies that offered

less than half the money for the sponsorship. Other important contracts were also

closed in Mexico, China and Japan.

- “Stage de pretemporada i gira”:

Tours and pre-season matches are two important sources of revenues to the club, also

they provide the club with an excellent opportunity to promote itself and its values. St.

Andrews (Scotland) stage in July has been done twice. In August the club went to the

USA where 2 matches were played. Other institutional and commercial acts also took

place as well as charities in order to project the social caring image of the club and

make it truly become “more than a club”.

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- Media:

Media strategy is based on 3 main pillars:

- International FC Barcelona TV: Current agreements with TV companies assure the

covering of the games to 150 countries.

- Internet: Make the club accessible to any fan in the world.

- New Media: New deals with respect to the distribution of mobile contents and

broadband, like for instance the one signed with the Arab company Etisalat.

- Licensing & FCB International school:

During this season a great expansion has occurred thanks to the opening of new

business areas. Mainly to the Asian, American and UAE markets. On the other hand FC

Barcelona’s football school has also expanded internationally by the means of campus

and football schools for children. Season 2008-2009 9 summer campus took place

internationally: Miami, Philadelphia, Castel di Sangro (Italy), Arhus, Helsingborg, Umea,

Istanbul, Kobe and Yokohama. More than 1.000 children participated in those summer

football campus and now FC Barcelona has 11 football schools all over the globe (

Mexico, Egypt, Kuwait, Dubai, Hong Kong) with 2.000 students.

As a result of this internationalization FC Barcelona has become a worldwide brand name with

more than 200 M followers. The opening of the Chinese and American markets remains both

as a challenge and a priority to FC Barcelona. On the one hand China is the most populated

country in the world where many fans can be capitalised, and on the other hand the USA is a

part from a big market the place where global brand names are created and sponsored. To

succeed in those markets is then the key to the success of the international project of FC

Barcelona.

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3.4 SPORT DEPARTMENTS

3.4.1 “Futbol Base”

In the past years FCB has been developing a new innovative strategy consisting on fast moves

and strongly offensive strategies. It has spread this tactic to its training school and has profited

from it by taking a great deal of top players from its school, these players virtually have 0 cost

and are all specialised on the same game tactics. Vertical integration on the production of

players eliminates any power suppliers could have used against the club and helps

consolidating the good economic results that FCB has been enjoying thanks to the raise in

revenues. However vertical integration is not been carried forward at the expense of the

players’ quality, on the contrary, the club makes sure that its players are fully specialised in its

tactics and strategies so that at the end of the day vertical integration represents a bigger

bonus to achieve. An example of the great performance of FCB’s training school is that players

such as Messi, Bojan, Pedro, Iniesta, Xavi, Puyol have been brought up there.

All FCB players feel happy in the club and have explicitly said that their wish is to continue in

the team and fight for as many titles as they can. This is an attitude that is enforced by two

main characteristics: The first one is that FCB is a successful team where players feel they have

a chance to outstand, and the second one is that they feel entitled to the club because of the

investment in terms of time and money as well as opportunities FCB’s training school provided

them with. The second characteristic is not common among other clubs and provides FCB with

a competitive advantage both in terms of costs (it is easier to maintain happy players within

the club) and motivation (it is easier to motivate them if they feel it is their club other than just

their job). In economic terms we could say that the value of FCB’s players coming from its

school (breaking contract values) raises up to 1.280 M€, but as we just pointed out in previous

paragraphs the feelings they have got with respect to the club are not by any means assessable

in terms of money and contribute greatly to the performance standards as well as to the club’s

world image.

In the balance sheets FCB formally incurs a loss of 20 M€ for its training school, however it is

probably crystal clear that this actual loss is just an investment that it is over satisfied by the

amounts of money saved in acquiring players in the market. Another disadvantage in the

balance sheets is that players coming from within the club count as an asset of value 0, while

outsiders do count as valuable assets. For instance Lionel Messi has an accounting value of 0

Euros whilst Maxwell of some millions, this does not seem to make sense as everyone knows

that the best player in the world is much more valuable than any ordinary player. In terms of

accountancy FCB is in a greater disadvantage compared to other clubs that base their strategy

on buying and not creating players because its own resources artificially look smaller in the

balance sheets.

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3.4.2 Basketball

The basketball department is the second one in terms of social and sportive projection of the

club. It was created in 1926 and it is the oldest deparment other than football. Handball

(1942), hockey (1942) and indoor’s football (1978) are the most recent ones and have less

success among the club members.

Basketball and all other departments have a very high level of achievements successes,

however they are a drawback for the club’s revenues. Just as it happened with football

basketball’s main revenue source have become commercial activities and publicity. Currently it

does not seem feasible to have a high level basketball department without a sponsor that

takes the image of the club and gives the name to it (AXA). Other examples of this sort are DKV

Joventut, Baskonia- Caja Laboral.

Saski Baskonia (Caja Laboral Baskonia) & DKV Joventut

Vitoria’s basketball club, Saski Baskonia, was founded in 1959, but it is more widely known as

“Tau”. This nickname comes from an old sponsor called “Ceràmiques Taulell” but it is currently

sponsored by Caja Laboral. We know have a glimpse on how Spanish basketball teams get

financed. DKV Joventut, founded in 1930, gets revenues from many sources: merchandising,

principal sponsor, 6 oficial sponsors, 2 oficial suppliers and 55 other companies. Both clubs

offer the option of sponsoring the club and publicly show the amount of money they get

through sponsoring. It is now crystal clear that the only option basketball teams are left in

order to finance themselves is by becoming an “advert-club”, selling their identity to

companies that seek publicity.

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3.5 MORE THAN A CLUB

The slogan “more than a club” is open-ended in meaning. It is perhaps this flexibility that

makes it so appropriate for defining the complexities of FC Barcelona’s identity, a club that

competes in a sporting sense on the field of play, but that also beats, every day, to the rhythm

of its people’s concerns. FC Barcelona is “more than a club” in Catalonia because it is the

institution that most represents the country and is one of its greatest ambassadors. Also, for

different reasons, FC Barcelona is “more than a club” for many people living elsewhere in

Spain, who see Barça as a staunch defender of democratic rights and freedom.

Today, football has become a global phenomenon, and support for Barcelona has spread

spectacularly around the world. The number of club members from outside of Catalonia and

Spain is increasing daily, and the club wants to reciprocally respond to that passion for Barça.

This has developed into a need and an obligation. And the best way for the club to do that has

been to take a step further and become “more than a club around the world” as well. This

Barça that is so concerned for its people needs to be globalized. This caring and humanitarian

Barça needs to be globalized. It is a strategic decision that is in keeping with the club’s history

and the way that football is continuing to develop on a worldwide basis. That is why the club

has decided to contribute 0.7 per cent of its ordinary income to the FC Barcelona Foundation

in order to set up international cooperation programs for development, supports the UN

Millennium Development Goals and has made a commitment to UNICEF’s humanitarian aid

programs through the donation of one and a half million Euros for the next five years and

currently wears the UNICEF logo on its shirts. An agreement that has made FC Barcelona

unique.

The following graph comes from a survey made to 50 FC Barcelona club members. We can see

a somewhat different pattern compared to the world image FC Barcelona gives. While 40% of

the national club members attach the biggest responsibility to the fact that FC Barcelona

represents Catalunya no one does just to the fact that they give money for charities,

nevertheless 37% of them think that “more than a club” means something much wider and

believe that it is all the answers that represent the spirit FC Barcelona has adopted nationally

and internationally. We can know start to understand what this feeling towards the club

means in terms of emotional attachments, long term supporters and potential customers. Just

to put an example, when FC Barcelona start wearing UNICEF’s logo on its shirt Nike nearly

doubled the price of the contract with the club, hence the differentiation of product by

offering something more than football proves to be on the right track.

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Should FC Barcelona have other sport departments? This is a very sensitive question that

departs from the constant contradiction between maximization of profits within a business

and the social or emotional considerations it has. However, it is not just an issue of social

consequences. FC Barcelona is not a normal company with a single owner, its owners are the

club members that decide on the policies and board of directors that will manage the club.

Then we should agree that is it their right to do what they like with the money their club earns,

even if that implies reducing its profits dramatically. But to what extent is the latter true?

Although in the short term FC Barcelona has a loss of 40M€ due to its secondary sport

departments it gains an indirect way of publicity. Investing that amount of money for sport

tells everyone that what they care about is sports and not money hence people associate FC

Barcelona with something more than a company and feel inclined support the club. We could

argue that it is the most aggressive marketing campaign in order to become not just a good

brand name in terms of sport but the leading one worldwide. In the following graph we can

see how an astonishing 92% of the surveyed club members want to have other sport

departments despite the losses it might carry.

40%

10%37%

13%

To you what does it mean that FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?

Catalunya's representantThe union of many people through sportA charity foundation

All the above

52%40%

8%Other sport departments

They are justified if there are no total losses bearing in mind that Barça's objective is not to make moneyBarça represents Catalunya and therefore they must exist

They are not justified and I would rather they closed them

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4. Profitability

Profitability and revenue analysis

As you can see in the following graph, FCB has an important role in the world stage of football.

In 2008-2009 revenues rose to 384 million Euros, thus proclaiming himself as the 2nd world’s

largest club in terms of revenues.

Something that intrigued us the most about this project was the low turnover FCB gets in

terms of profits. In the following graph we see that FCB gets a net pre tax profit of just 22

million Euros compared to that of Manchester United which gets 5 times a bigger profit

although its revenues are of a smaller amount. Although FCB’s first football team provides the

club with a profit of 67 M€, other activities like charity and other departments of the club such

as basketball, hockey and handball incur a net loss of nearly 60 M€ making the net profits fall

dramatically to a mere 6 M€.

Seasons

2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008

1 Reial Madrid Reial Madrid Reial Madrid Reial Madrid

2 Manchester United Manchester United Manchester United Manchester United

World

football 3 Barcelona Barcelona Barcelona Barcelona

ranking 4 Chelsea Bayern München Bayern München Bayern München

in terms of 5 Arsenal Chelsea Chelsea Chelsea

revenues 6 Liverpool Arsenal Arsenal Arsenal

7 A.C Milan Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool

8 Bayern München A.C. Milan A.C Milan A.C Milan

9 Internazionale Roma Roma Roma

10 Roma Internazionale Internazionale Internazionale

2003-2004

2004-2005

2005-2006

2006-2007

2007-2008

2008-2009

Manchester United 41,64 68,81 74,18 88,96 94,59 107,41

Reial Madrid 58,8 49 47,9 44 52 54

FCB 1,5 17,6 16,8 18,3 16,1 22,4

050

100150200

Profits M€

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Manchester United’s turnover before taxes is about 30%, FCB’s is about 20% and Reial

Madrid’s is about 30%. We can see that turnovers for the football industry are high and we will

now proceed to analyse why this so happens by using Porter’s five forces scheme:

1. High entry barriers:

In order to create a football club a big initial investment is required, needless to say, there

are very strong emotional attachments to the people’s old football teams. Therefore entry

barriers are high for new brand football clubs.

2. Low exit barriers:

They are more of an emotional nature than an economical one because breaking contracts

with players and club members can easily be solved whilst the emotional gap that you

leave to the club members and the terrible social publicity deriving from a foreclosure is

far more damaging.

3. Low power vis-à-vis suppliers:

As years go past the cost of buying new good quality players is rising at an unstoppable

level, thus showing the declining power of negotiation held by the football clubs. A way to

foresee and avoid this problem is by vertically integrating the productions of players and

hence reducing costs. An example of this strategy is FCB where about 50% of the players in

the first team were trained within the club.

4. High power vis-à-vis customers:

Football is a sport followed by hundreds of millions of people but that concentrates most

of its fans within a rather small range of clubs (about 20 important clubs), therefore there

is a high concentration of suppliers against the customers’ interests. This situation is highly

advantageous to the important and champion teams who are able to constantly get

contracts that provide huge amounts of money pouring into the clubs.

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5. Rivalry:

European markets have already been distributed among the predominant clubs, this fact

carries high emotional attachments to a certain team and hence makes it very hard for

European clubs to get more fans coming from other European teams. However, China and

USA have proved to be markets of a very high potential of growth with no good teams

coming from there, an scenario that encourages up to the ultimate European club to get a

slice of those markets. Competition amongst clubs is then assured in order to conquer new

markets although they can always rely on their part of the European market if they ever

need a place where to retreat while the performance of their team improves.

6. Substitutes: other sports could substitute football but this trend does not seem to be

followed, actually the last Super Bowl’s final was undermined by the football World Cup

which by first time in history got more TV share the Super Bowl one.

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5. Conclusion

FC Barcelona is the strongest brand name in Catalunya, statistics estimate that it has about 200

million followers in the world and enjoys economic results, though not those of a big company,

that are within the best of the sector. Since 2003 Laporta’s management has been based on an

ambitious strategy of both internationalizing and self-identification with the country. We

found this approach very interesting and was the reason that pushed us to start this project.

The momentum FC Barcelona as a brand name has been used to expand the club values by the

means of a differentiation process that has risen the interest of many sponsors and people all

over the world. This fact has made the revenues of the club rise sky high in comparison on how

they were some years before when the club did not have an international focus. Although the

rise in revenues FC Barcelona identified the cost of players as a threat to its project and started

a vertical integration in the production of high quality players that already now the tactics of

the team.

FC Barcelona is one of the last football clubs that is still owned by its members, this makes that

the policies followed can at some stages differ from those of the privately owned clubs.

Although we could see this fact as a drawback and a loss of incentives, this difference provides

the club with feelings and emotions that are shared amongst all the members and fans which

enhance and promote at a higher degree the brand name FC Barcelona. These reasons

economically support the current management of the club and if we add the role it has as a

national team in Catalunya FC Barcelona does really and truly become MÉS QUE UN CLUB.

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6. Bibliography

- Delloite agency

- fcbarcelona.cat

- Entrevista Joan Oliver

- IESE: www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/OP-06-12.pdf

- REAL MADRID CF - FC BARCELONA: ANALISIS DE LAS ESTRATEGIAS

ECONOMICA I DEPORTIVA DEL PERIODO 2000-2006

- penya.com

- baskonia.com

Page 20: Futbol Club Barcelona Molt més que un club

20

ANNEX 1

Interview

Entrevista a Joan Oliver, director general corporatiu del F.C.Barcelona

(Transcripció)

10-03-2010, Oficines del F.C.Barcelona

Per què va decidir entrar a l’executiva del F.C.Barcelona?

Bé, jo sóc un ‘tio’ raro. Primer vaig estudiar història i econòmiques, i m’he passat la vida fent

feines rares. Vaig començar escrivint; em vaig dedicar al món de les finances, de les inversions;

després vaig crear una empresa d’informació electrònica, els anys vuitanta, i em vaig arruïnar –

cosa que és molt sana–; després vaig treballar pel grup financial times; més tard vaig treballar

a TV3; he anat fem mil coses a la vida. Llavors arriba un moment que les empreses que només

són empreses no em diverteixen; no sé si és molt pretensiós, però és veritat. I m’agraden els

món on, a banda de l’aspecte de la gestió, hi ha certs graus de passió, altres components més

divertits que no són el mer business. Els business amb passió també són més complicats de

gestionar, perquè no els pots mesurar, només, amb ratis financers. Però trobo que són molt

més atractius.

I quins elements té el Barça que el fan esdevenir un “business amb passió”?

El Barça té dos elements essencials. Un és la passió que genera la cosa “futbolera” i esportiva,

que fa que sigui divertit de gestionar; i l’altre és el seu significat especial a Catalunya pel que

representa pels catalans. Per tant, la meva impressió és que el Barça és la marca més potent

que té Catalunya, amb molta diferència –tot i que com a empresa no sigui la més important de

Catalunya, ni de molt– però sí que és la marca més potent que té, la que té més projecció

mundial. I per tant, gestionar el Barça té la gràcia d’estar gestionant dirigint una empresa com

tantes n’hi ha a Catalunya però amb el valor afegit de la passió que desperta el futbol.

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Per tant, la seva feina com a director general corporatiu del Barça, en què difereix d’una

empresa qualsevol?

No difereix de res, però has de saber administrar la passió del culer i la imatge global dels

catalans. És a dir, el Barça en els fons és una pime, una empresa mitjaneta, perquè facturen

400 milions d’euros l’any, que no és gaire, però amb una marca que és de les més grosses del

món. Per tant, la gestió del Barça, en gran mesura, és més la gestió de la marca que la pura

gestió de -----.

Entenc, doncs, que la marca Barça es podria explotar més econòmicament, si l’objectiu

d’aquest fos maximitzar beneficis. Vull dir, se sap que les seccions com el bàsquet, l’Handbol

o l’Hoquei són deficitàries però no s’eliminen. Per què?

Què és una marca? Bé, jo no ho sé definir, però una marca ve a ser una cosa que aconsegueix

transmetre unes determinades percepcions, és a dir, amb el Barça, tu has d’explicar una sèrie

de coses. Fixeu-vos que fa un anys, el Barça era un club molt local. Va començar sent un club

de les corts, després va ser un club de Barcelona, i després un club de Catalunya, un club

català. Però avui en dia el Barça ha deixat de ser local i és global. Llavors el Barça té un

problema, com tothom, que és omplir de contingut, donar valor a la seva marca, la a seva

imatge. Hi ha coses que formes part d’aquesta imatge, d’aquest valor de marca que el Barça

té. Com a mínim n’hi ha tres d’importants. N’hi ha una, que és allò que és “Més que un club”,

que històricament s’ha explicat amb la cosa catalana i no sé què i que ara la millor manera

d’explicar-ho és amb UNICEF. Aquests senyors són més que un club, ¿per què? Doncs perquè

porten UNICEF a la samarreta i enlloc de cobrar diners, com fan la resta de clubs del món,

paguen a UNICEF per portar UNICEF a la samarreta. Això suposa deixar d’ingressar diners, però

suposa també reforçar la marca. Jo crec que, en el cas de les seccions, pots fer un raonament

relativament similar. És veritat que les seccions tenen un cost per a tu, però et donen unes

característiques de club únic al món. És un club multiesportiu, que és número u en futbol, però

que aposta també per altres esports. Per tant, si tu fas l’anàlisi, estrictament, des del terreny

econòmic, això no surt a compte. Ara, si tu dius: ¿quina és la contribució de les seccions a la

marca, o a l’ADN, del Barça, te n’adones que és una contribució important.

És una inversió a llarg termini?

Sí, però ja no pensis en els diners que aconsegueixes, et dóna una manera de ser, un perfil

diferent dels altres club i jo crec que aquesta és una raó bastant essencial per explicar el tema

de les seccions. A més de l’exemple d’UNICEF, encara n’hi ha un altre, la tercera pota

d’aquesta identitat o manera de ser, i és el fet que és un club que no té amo,

extraordinàriament democràtic que, en el límit, podríem dir que és propietat dels 170.000

socis. Llavors, això també té conseqüències econòmiques. Vosaltres us heu fixat amb això

d’UNICEF o això de les seccions i heu dit: al Barça són Burros perquè perden vint milions i

escaig d’euros l’any per no posar el nom d’una marca comercial a la samarreta, però també

podríeu haver dit: al Barça són burros, perquè perden molts milions l’any perquè tenen un

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preu de les entrades i dels socis i abonaments molt baix. ¿Per què passa això? Perquè el Barça

és propietat d’aquesta gent. De tota la vida, quan tu tens una determinada identitat, del que

has de ser capaç és de treure rendiment d’aquesta identitat encara que a curt termini et costi

diners. És a dir: si el Barça demà decidís posar una publicitat a les samarretes que no fos

UNICEF, carregar-se les seccions, i apujar el preu dels abonaments segurament ingressaria 50 o

60 milions d’euros més l’any. Ara bé: deixaríem de ser el que som. ¿Això sortiria a compte a

llarg termini? La meva impressió és que no. La meva impressió és que si som el primer club del

món quant a seguidors, fans, etcètera, tot això és precisament perquè tenim una identitat

molt diferenciada, molt específica.

En canvi, això, el soci no sembla que ho sàpiga. En les enquestes que hem fet pel treball,

molts es queixaven de què els havien apujat el preu de les entrades, i la imatge que tenen és

que els estan exprimint; tot i que els altre clubs són molt més cars.

Penseu que vivim uns temps econòmicament difícils i la gent es toca la butxaca. Això és com

quan la gent agafa un preu en euros i ho compara amb quan valia en pessetes. I no se n’adona

que entre el moment en què ell pagava amb pessetes i ara han passat sis o set anys i hi ha

hagut un procés d’inflació. És a dir, la percepció del consumidor moltes vegades no és correcta.

Agafeu els preus dels abonaments d’altres clubs, per no parlar de la Premier League, i

compareu. Som els més barats.

*sobre l’estratègia del Barça en l’era Laporta+ Bàsicament és pensar que si tu fas les coses bé, si

tu jugues a mantenir la teva identitat –us he parlat d’identitat en el terreny exterior però

evidentment hi ha una identitat també pel que fa a l’estil de joc– si tu jugues a això, això

mateix et permet fer créixer els teus ingressos. Des del 2003 fins ara els ingressos del Barça

s’han multiplicat per 2.7, és a dir, han passat, en números tontos, de 150 milions a 400. ¿Com

has fet això? Ho has potenciant, justament, potencial la teva imatge i convertint-te en una

marca global. Per tant, l’estratègia és aquesta. No és intentar estalviar, retallant la despesa,

sinó ser el número u del món, que ho som. El que farà que hagi de gastar més però, per

suposat, que ingressi més.

Els ingressos que genera el marketing són més nacionals o més internacionals?

Cada cop més internacionals. Et dono un parell d’exemples perquè ho entenguis. Nosaltres

tenim un sponsor des de fa molts anys, que és Telefónica. Telefónica ens paga

aproximadament 1,5 milions d’euros l’any per ser sponsor de telecomunicacions a tot el món.

L’any passat varem tancar un acord amb una companyia de telefonia mòbil d’Abu Dhabi, pel

qual aquesta gent és sponsor per una determinada zona: l’orient mitjà, un tros d’àfrica oriental

i un tros de l’Àsia occidental, i ens paguen tres milions d’euros l’any. Un altre exemple. Fa poc

hem firmat amb Turkish airlines un acord pel qual ens paguen una mica més de dos milions

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d’euros l’any per ser l’aerolínia del Barça. I fins fa un any nosaltres teníem un patrocinador

aerolínia que era Vueling que ens pagava mig milió d’euros l’any. És a dir: és evident que quan

tu fas el salt de ser una marca local a una marca global, se t’obren unes oportunitats de negoci

molt més importants, i cada vegada aquestes oportunitats de negoci les vas capitalitzant més.

El problema que tens és que el tema dels sponsors requereix un temps de maduració. Els

contractes són a tres, quatre, cinc anys, i per tant tot això d’ampliar sponsors a companyies

internacionals i de substitució d’sponsors és un procés progressiu. Nosaltres, fa dos anys que

tenim gent del club que viu i treballa sempre a Nova York, per entendre’ns. I tot això et

demostra aquest canvi d’orientació, aquest canvi de mentalitat.

Les gires que es fan a EUA han obert mercat, imaginem.

Han obert mercat extraordinàriament a Amèrica, sí.

I això que allà no es segueix gaire el futbol. Però deu passar que Amèrica, o l’Àsia, estan

encara per conquerir; vull dir, aquí tothom és d’un equip, i no els mous, però allà encara no.

Sí. És evident que els dos mercats estratègics, per a nosaltres i per a qualsevol, són els EUA i la

Xina. Això no cal ser massa llest per saber-ho. Però hi ha una diferència que és que l’Àsia, i

específicament la Xina, és important pel potencial de consum que té. Però, en canvi, Els EUA,

no només és important pel potencial de consum, sinó per la capacitat de fabricar cultura a

nivell mundial. Penseu en qualsevol gran marca, en qualsevol terreny. Totes elles passen per

EUA. Allí es fabriquen les marques del món.

Nosaltres tenim un pressupost d’uns 400 milions i, segons les estadístiques, 200 milions de

seguidors fanàtics arreu del món. Si som capaços, només, de treure’ls un euro a cadascun

d’aquests seguidors a l’any, només un euro l’any, haurem augmentat el pressupost un 50%.

Potser això ho aconsegueixes amb el PPV dels drets televisius.

Bé, això ho pots aconseguir via televisió, i tens camins indirectes, però també tens les

samarretes, el marxandatge, que es comprin despertadors, o sabatilles, o calçotets del Barça;

vull dir: tens molts camins. El nostre gran repte de creixement és que el volum de seguidors

que tenim a tot el món ens generi més ingressos.

Què més?

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Sobre el futbol base, nosaltres l’hem pres com una inversió tot i que genera pèrdues...

Sí, és una inversió. Aquí tens un problema molt curiós i és que, formalment, el que tu gastes en

futbol base no és una inversió sinó una despesa. I això és una bestiesa. Té una contrapartida

que és molt bèstia que és que, si tu tens molts jugadors del plantes, com és el cas del Barça i és

evident que és el model que funciona, tens un club amb menys patrimoni que si compres. El

Messi, a la nostra comptabilitat, val 0. Perquè l’hem fabricat, no l’hem comprat; en canvi, el

Maxwell, té un valer en llibre superior al Leo Messi. És una animalada.

Els jugadors són actius?

Són actius és clar. Són actius que tu amortitzes. Tu valores el preu de compra, el traspàs que

pagues, i ho amortitzes amb els anys de contracta que tens. Cada any amortitzes la part que

correspon.

Tu et mires el balanç del Manchester City, que és l’equip que compra més del món, i la seva

plantilla val molt més que la del Barça, perquè ho ha comprat tot. En canvi, nosaltres, com que

les peces importants de la plantilla no les hem comprat sinó que vénen de la casa, figura que

val menys.

En cas que es volgués vendre un jugador quedaria reflectit, però?

Sí, però això té la contrapartida que si tu t’imagines un balanç, tens uns recursos propis molt

petits. Això fa que tu, comptablement, siguis un club poc capitalitzat. Quan és mentida. En

realitat el que passa és que tu tens un actiu del que, seguit les regles comptables que

evidentment no estan fetes pensant en un club de futbol sinó amb empreses que fan botons,

com si diguéssim, no en pots reflectir el valor real.

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ANNEX 2

Surveys

GENERAL RESULTS:

1- Age range:

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

10-30 11 22,92% 11 22,93% 30-50 18 37,50% 29 60,42% + than 50 19 39,58% 48 100%

2- Opinion on economic management:

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

Very good 33 68,75% 33 68,75% Fine 13 27,08% 46 95,83% Bad 2 4,17% 48 100%

3- Other sport departments:

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

They are justified if there are no total losses bearing in mind that Barça's objective is not to make money

25 52,08% 25

52,08%

Barça represents Catalunya and therefore they must exist

19 39,58% 44 91,67%

They are not justified and I would rather they closed them

4 8,33% 48 100%

69%

27%

4%

Opinion on economic management

Very good

Fine

Bad

23%

37%

40%

Age range

10.-30.

30.-50.

Older than 50

52%40%

8%

Other sport departments

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4- Do you follow other sport departments?

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

Yes, basketball 28 58,33% 28 58,33% Yes, hockey 0 0% 28 58,33% Yes, handball 0 0% 28 58,33% Yes, indoor’s football 1 2,08% 29 60,42% Yes, all of them 11 22,92% 40 83,33% None 8 16,67% 48 100%

5- To you what does it mean that FC Barcelona is "more than a club"?

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

Catalunya’s representant

19 39,58% 19 39,58%

The union of many people through sport

5 10,42% 24 50%

A charity foundation 0 0% 24 50% All the above 18 37,50% 42 87,50% None 6 12,50% 48 100%

AGE: 10-30 YEARS OLD

6- Opinion on economic management:

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

Very good 11 100% 11 100% Fine 0 0% 11 100% Bad 0 0% 11 100%

Yes, basketball

Yes, hockey

Yes, handball

Yes, indoor's football

Yes, all of them

None

58,33%

0,00%

0,00%

2,08%

22,92%

16,67%

Do you follow othersport departments?

40%

10%

37%

13%

To you what does it meanthat FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?

Catalunya's representant

The union of many people through sport

A charity foundation

All the above

100%

0%

Opinion on economicmanagement:

Very good

Fine

Bad

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7- Other sport departments:

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

They are justified if there are no total losses bearing in mind that Barça's objective is not to make money

5 45,45% 5

45,45%

Barça represents Catalunya and therefore they must exist

5 45,45% 10 90,91%

They are not justified and I would rather they closed them

1 9,09% 11 100%

8- Do you follow other sport departments?

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

Yes, basketball 5 45,45% 5 45,45% Yes, hockey 0 0% 5 45,45% Yes, handball 0 0% 5 45,45% Yes, indoor’s football 1 9,09% 6 54,55% Yes, all of them 3 27,27% 9 81,82% None 2 18,18% 11 100%

9- To you what does it mean that FC Barcelona is "more than a club"?

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

Catalunya’s representant

3 27,27% 3 27,27%

The union of many people through sport

1 9,09% 4

36,36%

A charity foundation 0 0% 4 36,36% All the above 5 45,45% 9 81,82% None 2 18,18% 11 100%

46%

45%

9%

Other sport departments

Yes, basketball

Yes, hockey

Yes, handball

Yes, indoor's football

Yes, all of them

None

45,45%

0,00%

0,00%

9,09%

27,27%

18,18%

Do you follow othersport departments?

27%

9%

0%

46%

18%

To you what does it mean that FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?

Catalunya's representant

The union of many people through sportA charity foundation

All the above

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AGE: 30-50 YEARS OLD

10- Opinion on economic management:

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

Very good 13 72,22% 13 72,22% Fine 4 22,22% 17 94,44% Bad 1 5,26% 18 100%

11- Other sport departments:

12- Do you follow other sport departments?

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

Yes, basketball 11 61,11% 11 61,11% Yes, hockey 0 0% 11 61,11% Yes, handball 0 0% 11 61,11% Yes, indoor’s football 0 0% 11 61,11% Yes, all of them 5 27,78% 16 88,89% None 2 11,11% 18 100%

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

They are justified if there are no total losses bearing in mind that Barça's objective is not to make money

8 44,44% 8

44,44%

Barça represents Catalunya and therefore they must exist

9 50% 17

94,44%

They are not justified and I would rather they closed them

1 5,56% 18 100%

72%

22%

6%

Opinion on economic management

Very good

Fine

Bad

44%

50%

6%

Other sport departments

Yes, basketball

Yes, hockey

Yes, handball

Yes, indoor's football

Yes, all of them

None

61,11%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

27,78%

11,11%

Do you follow other sport departments?

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13- To you what does it mean that FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

Catalunya’s representant

3 16,67% 3 16,67%

The union of many people through sport

4 22,22% 7 38,89%

A charity foundation 0 0% 7 38,89% All the above 9 50% 16 88,89% None 2 11,11% 18 100%

AGE: + THAN 50 YEARS OLD

14- Opinion on economic management:

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

Very good 9 47,37% 9 47,37% Fine 9 47,37% 18 94,74% Bad 1 5,26% 19 100%

15- Other sport departments:

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

They are justified if there are no total losses bearing in mind that Barça's objective is not to make money

12 63,16%% 12

63,16%%

Barça represents Catalunya and therefore they must exist

5 26,32% 17 89,47%

They are not justified and I would rather they closed them

2 10,53% 19 100%

48%

47%

5%

Opinion on economicmanagement

Very good

Fine

Bad

63%

26%

11%

Other sport departments

17%

22%

0%

50%

11%

To you what does it mean that FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?

Catalunya's representant

The union of many people through sport

A charity foundation

All the above

None

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16- Do you follow other sport departments?

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

Yes, basketball 12 63,16% 12 63,16% Yes, hockey 0 0% 12 63,16% Yes, handball 0 0% 12 63,16% Yes, indoor’s football 0 0% 12 63,16% Yes, all of them 3 15,79% 15 78,95% None 4 21,05% 19 100%

17- To you what does it mean that FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?

Absolute frequency

Relative frequency

Abs. Cum. frequency

Rel. Cum. frequency

Catalunya’s representant

13 68,42% 13

68,42%

The union of many people through sport

0 0% 13 68,42%

A charity foundation 0 0% 13 68,42% All the above 4 21,05% 17 89,47% None 2 10,53% 19 100%

COMPARISON:

- Opinion on economic management:

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Very good Fine Bad

100%

0% 0%

72%

22%

6%

48% 47%

5%

Opinion on economic management

10.-30

30-50

+ de 50

Yes, basketball

Yes, hockey

Yes, handball

Yes, indoor's football

Yes, all of them

None

63,16%

0,00%

0,00%

0,00%

15,79%

21,05%

Do you follow other sport departments?

68%

0%

0%

21%

11%

To you what does it mean that FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?

Catalunya's representant

The union of many people through sport

A charity foundation

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- Other sport departments:

- Do you follow other sport departments?

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%

They are justified if there are no

total losses bearing in mind

that Barça's objective is not to make money

Barça represents Catalunya and therefore they

must exist

They are not justified and I would rather

they closed them

46% 45%

9%

44%50%

6%

63%

26%

11%

Other sport departments

10.-30

30-50

+ de 50

0,00%

10,00%

20,00%

30,00%

40,00%

50,00%

60,00%

70,00%

45,45%

0% 0%

9,09%

27,27%

18,18%

61,11%

0%

27,78%

11,11%

63,16%

15,79%

21,05%

Do you follow other sport departments?

10.-30

30-50

+ de 50

Page 32: Futbol Club Barcelona Molt més que un club

32

- To you what does it mean that FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?

0,00%

20,00%

40,00%

60,00%

80,00%

27,27%

9,09%0%

45,45%

18,18%16,67%

22,22%

50%

11,11%

68,42%

0%

21,05%

10,53%

To you what does it mean that FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?

10.-30

30-50

+ de 50

Page 33: Futbol Club Barcelona Molt més que un club

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ANNEX 3

Economic results

Sport Deparments results: (in Milions of €)

2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09

Primer equip

6,297 0,835 -135,975 33,229 37,886 53,759 46,106 44,089 66,777

Futbol base

0 3,523 0 -6,103 -6,923 -9,729 -12,337 -13,188 -19,287

Bàsquet 0 0 0 -8,79 -8,479 -13,428 -16,549 -14,797 -20,757

Handbol 0 0 0 -3,902 -3,175 -3,804 -4,64 -4,902 -5,52

Hoquei 0 0 0 -1,419 -1,701 -1,77 -2,607 -1,945 -2,218

Altres seccions

0 0 0 -1,579 -2,487 -2,957 -3,79 -5,174 -6,372

Altrres activitats del club

0 2,865 -28,046 -9,942 21,595 10,91 0,638 5,986 -5,972

TOTAL 6,297 7,225 -164,021 1,494 36,715 32,981 6,821 10,069 6,652

6,297 7,225

-164,021

1,494

36,715 32,981

6,821 10,069 6,652

-175

-150

-125

-100

-75

-50

-25

0

25

50

20

00

/01

20

01

/02

20

02

/03

20

03

/04

20

04

/05

20

05

/06

20

06

/07

20

07

/08

20

08

/09

Resultats Finals del FCBXifres en Milions d'euros.

Page 34: Futbol Club Barcelona Molt més que un club

34

6,297 0,835

-135,975

33,229 37,88653,759 46,106 44,089

66,777

-150

-100

-50

0

50

100

20

00

/01

20

01

/02

20

02

/03

20

03

/04

20

04

/05

20

05

/06

20

06

/07

20

07

/08

20

08

/09

Resultats finals: Primer equipXifres en Milions d'euros.

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

4 5 6 7 8 9

Resultats finals: Seccions

Futbol base

Bàsquet

Handbol

Hoquei

Altres seccions

Xifres en Milions d'euros.

-8,79 -8,479

-13,428-16,549 -14,797

-20,757-25

-15

-5

5

15

25

Resultats finals: BàsquetXifres en Milions d'euros.