Passenger Sheips RINA

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Accidents Involving Passenger Ship Stability

1 SUMMARY

Various accidents at sea highlight the stakes modern marine transport represent towards safety of life andenvironment. Though such accidents normally are initiated by human errors, by poor maintenance, or both, the

outcome might in many cases have been different if design and control of operation by authorities had been better. This paper, written by a former officer, call for improvement of these matters. Furthermore this paper briefly illuminates the use of time-domain simulations to support functionalistic design and to motivate shipcrew as well as control authorities for proper actions. Real-time analyzes of roll to verify ship stability is shortlydiscussed. Below the surface of the text is the old engineering concept questioned: Paragraph Ships, the state ofthe art!

2. INTRODUCTION

Since the MV Estonia sank on 28 September 1994the public of Sweden and Estonia seem not to haveaccepted the official investigation performed by theJoint Accident Investigation Commission

(JAIC).[1] Estonian authorities were forced toreopen the investigation in the spring of 2006 butSwedish authorities refused to participate. Theywere, however, forced to start their ownreinvestigation shortly afterwards. The Swedishreinvestigation was halted in the autumn as thechancellor of justice requested the government

whether to include the initial part of the originalinvestigation or not. The Swedish governmentdecided in January 2007 to do a full reinvestigationand to exempt divers from promise of secrecy. Asthe case now stands one may summarize some key

elements:• The official investigation report seems utterly

unsupported as its findings do not fit observedsinking scenario.

• The Royal Swedish Navy screened covertdiving operations shortly after the sinking.

Figure 1: Computer generated pictures [1]

The MV Estonia disaster caught my interest in theautumn of 2005 and I have been working on thesubject ever since. In coherence with a study oftheory of science I have prepared an article; MV

Estonia, a Plausible Sinking Scenario, as well as anessay; Ethics of European Ships Design, in additionto this paper.

Radar and modern navigational equipment have inmany ways reduced probability of collision andgrounding. Consequently disasters like the Titanicand the Empress of Ireland, where approximately2500 seafarers perished in a couple of years, aremore unlikely today than in those days. However, ifsuch incidents are to happen, modern carriers of

passenger are hardly much better suited to handlethe consequences. In other words: The probability

of a major disaster, if damage occurs, remains veryhigh. This was highlighted last year, in 2006, whenthe loss of 1069 seafarers in the Al SalamBoccaccio 98 case caused average loss to triple forthat year. Though statistics of accidents at sea arenot easily obtainable, the average seems to beapproximately 600 for the Ro-Ro Pax versusapproximately 1000 for aviation. This is in myopinion quite unacceptable and this particularly soas minor changes might improve safetysubstantially. Unfortunately the costs of thesedisasters are passed on to the bereaved and thecountries of the victims while commerce seemsnearly undisturbed.[2] Fortunately Panamanianauthorities have decided to strengthen their MarineAccident Investigation Bureau in the aftermath ofthe Al Salam Boccaccio 98 case.

Accidents Involving Passenger Ship Stability page 1 of 10


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Vigilance and common sense are importantqualifications for ship command and many disastersare due to lack of such. In this paper vigilance bythe naval architectural community and the maritimeadministrations will be focused on as a number of

passenger ship accidents, which have caught myinterest, will be discussed.

3. SHIP SURVIVAL DESIGN PRINCIPLES.This chapter is primarily intended for thoseunfamiliar with ship design principles. It mayhowever be worth reading for naval architects aswell, to focus on some essential design principles,important for the safety of seafarers.

3.1. COLLISION AND ENGINE ROOM

BULKHEADS

Figure 2: Collision and engine room bulkheads

To ensure sufficient survivability for ships colliding by head, ships are required to have a forwardcollision bulkhead located far enough behind thestem to ensure water not penetrating into the main

part of the submerged part of the hull. All ships areexpected to survive absolute destruction in front ofthis bulkhead. Similarly an engine-room bulkheadis positioned in front of the engine-room in case ofcollision by the stern. Furthermore, the raised decksat each end of the ship is higher than for the middle

part of the ship and these volumes, forecastle and poop represent spare buoyancy of outmostimportance in time of peril.

3.2. FURTHER SUBDIVISION TO SURVIVECOLLISION BY BEAM

Figure 3: Additional transversal bulkheads

To ensure sufficient survivability for ships colliding by the beam the region between above mentioned bulkheads are subdivided into watertightcompartments. Passenger ships are expected towithstand destruction of ZERO, 1 or 2 suchcompartments depending of their size and otherfactors thus the ships are called ZERO, 1 or 2

compartment ships. Other more complicated rulesapply for cargo ships, as they are expected to have a

certain degree of survivability depending on theirsize.

3.3. SUBDIVISION TO PREVENT SINKINGAFTER RAKING/SHOALING

Figure 4: Double bottom

To ensure sufficient survivability for ships rakingshoals, double bottom is used. Passenger ships arein general expected to withstand raking while cargoships are not. Many cargo ships do, however, havedouble bottom of various reasons thus they do haveexcellent survivability in case of raking. Others do

not, and the problem of raking damage for cargoships was highlighted by the Rocknes case.

For many years, high speed passenger crafts wereexempted from the raking survivability principle,and this is particularly strange as raking is highly

probable for high speed crafts. Taking into accountthat such ships were likely to capsize / sink too fastto allow disembarkation, huge number of casualtieshad to be expected.

3.4. FIRE PROTECTION

Figure 5: Fire-resistant bulkheads

To ensure sufficient survivability in case of fire, passenger ships are subdivided vertically into fireresistant bulkheads with doors that may be remotelyclosed by ships’ command. The failure of suchclosure may be disastrous as fire may move

horizontally.[3] Modern ships make use of fireresistant materials to prevent fire to ignite anddevelop. Nevertheless, the fire of Scandinavian Star

proved such materials did not comply with theintention and the fire diverged rapidly. Sprinklersystems in a “ship-hotel” where evacuation has to

be done upward should be of tremendous help.Surely such systems have to be accompanied bydrainage systems to prevent capsize.

3.5. THE RO RO EXEMPTIONSIn order to facilitate driving of vehicles aboard the

Ro-Ro ships, they are exempted from normalsubdivision rules above the main deck and this is

primarily a problem for the offshore ferries.



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Furthermore, to lower the center of gravity, thegarage is located as low as possible. Consequentlythe height of the watertight bulkheads is minimized.

Garage

Figure 6: The Ro-Ro Pax garage

The buoyancy of the traditional forecastle isexpected to be maintained by a closable barrierextending the collision bulkhead. Similar barrier isnot requested astern and consequently these shipsdo not have a poop in case of damage. Furthermore,the weather-tight openings in the hull must beconsidered a weakening of the structure. The garageof these ships represents tremendous spare

buoyancy when intact. However, while damaged itis a potential accumulator of water, which maycause internal monster-waves at time of peril.

3.6. THE GRANDFATHER CLAUSEThe Grandfather Clause is a guideline for IMO’srulemaking. It is a common agreement that rulesshall not have retroactive effect.[3] The Grandfather

rule is not fully working and minor amendments arecarried out. Now and then major amendments areagreed upon though the industry is permitted longtime to carry out such upgradings.

4. A COUPLE OF NORWEGIANACCIDENTS

4.1. MF EIDFJORDIn the Eidfjord case an unsecured bus with 8

passengers aboard rolled off a Norwegian inshoreferry. 6 of them perished. The following day thedirector in charge of passenger ships at the

Norwegian Maritime Directorate could tell themedia that a feared horror scenario had been: A

passenger attempting to open the bus-door, whilethe bus-driver was sitting in the ferries saloon,could accidentally open the brakes rather than the

door causing the bus to roll off the ferry.[4] The potential consequence of brake failure had beendemonstrated the previous year when a semi-trailerstarted to roll off a similar ferry. The semi-trailerwas saved as the chassis of the wagon fastened tothe deck while the pulling car was hanging by itshook outside the ferry.

4.2. SLEIPNER II

Figure 7: Sleipner II



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Sleipner I (1976), St Malo (1995) & Sleipner II(1999) were all twin hull high speed passengercrafts which suffered raking. Though raking musthave been considered a very likely scenario fromthe outset and the Norwegian naval forces had quite

some experience in that respect; the problem wasnot addressed initially. Whether mere negligence orsaving of weight and energy was the motive isunknown but it is quite obvious that the use of theseships invited for disaster.

Nobody perished in the Sleipner I sinking.However, the vulnerability of these ships wasdemonstrated and it was a close race. The toll couldhave been 170 causalities. Thus warned one shouldexpect authorities to prevent similar incidents from

becoming disasters by introducing suitableregulations. That was not the case; the trade’s

change to bigger ships increased the potential ofdisaster.

Nobody perished in the St Malo close to disastereither. Certified for 400 passengers she carried only300 passengers, at time of raking. The preliminaryinvestigation concluded:[6]

$12.21: The accident has demonstrated that forthis kind of craft a relatively minor grounding

can cause catastrophic damage with

potentially grave consequences for the safety of

passengers. …$12.14: It is questionable whether seven crew

members is sufficient number to control theevacuation of 300passengers. More control

was needed in the liferafts themselves …

Sleipner II, designed after the St. Malo accident,was built without double bottom though thedesigner and the authorities were fully aware of the

perils. The college of her hometown had warnedthem and before construction commenced, thestudents were lectured regarding the damagescenario that soon was to prove disastrous. Shortlyafter her maiden voyage Sleipner II struck a shoalclose to the one Sleipner I had struck and 16

passengers perished. The toll could have been muchhigher if fully loaded.

The Sleipner II commission of inquiry pointed out,regarding a prospective raking requirement, thatthere was no reason to accept leaner inshore thanoffshore requirements.[4, $3.2.1] All the same,

Norwegian authorities nowadays employ leanerregulations than internationally recommended.Consequently a much worse disaster than theSleipner II may occur at any time in our waters.From a safety point of view it is difficult to acceptsuch lenience. One should rather expect extra

buoyancy fitted inside the tanks of existing ships,either by foam, by rubber pontoons or something of

the sort. Fortunately, to ensure better second handvalue, some Norwegian owners orders new shipsaccording to present international regulations.

The perils of these crafts should be well known to

Norwegian Maritime Authorities as their directorwas member of the Sleipner II commission ofinquiry. They have in fact, due to the accident,required such ships to record names of passengers.The owners of Sleipner II, however, did not informtheir crews properly regarding this requirement.[7]

5. RO RO PAXRo Ro Pax, the huge offshore ferries so importantfor modern car-tourism have from the beginning

been considered hazardous due to the huge garages,as potential accumulation of water on the cardeck

might move the center of gravity and endangerrapid capsize. As capsize may trap everybodyinside the ship, the potential is total loss. In manycases fortune has been better, still the toll isextreme.

Ro Ro Pax represents a tremendous trade off between safety and freightage which I doubt isreasonable for society. These ships seem by nature

primarily designed for holiday transport of privatecars and passengers. In the off season they transportlorries in the garage, while cheap conferencing andweekend tourism, based on tax exemptions, is

carried out in the hotel. Stricter safety would, I presume, be affordable and preferable for theseafarers involved.

Figure 8: Cougar Ace 25/07/06

Since Ro Ro cargo ships has no windows, inflowrate will be very low. Consequently probability ofdisaster is much lower for cargo ships.



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5.2. ESTONIA5.1. HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISEWhile the investigation of the Herald of FreeEnterprise disaster seems respected, the Estoniainvestigation is thoroughly criticized and it hasrecently been reopened both in Sweden and Estoniadue to severe political pressure. From Norwegian

recent history we had a resembling case, the fishing boat Utvik Senior which disappeared at the westerncoast of Norway during a naval maneuver. Theinitial investigation was heavily criticized and theauthorities was forced to reinvestigate when privateinvestigation proved, beyond any reasonable doubt,that the fishing boat had been knocked of the ocean

by tremendous force. A reader’s letter summed itup this way: The Utvik Senior case provesauthorities to have manipulated, lied, conceivedevidence, etc until the authorities’ trousers were

pulled down by two journalists.[10]

Figure 9: Herald of Free Enterprise

The bow-visor of Herald of Free Enterprise was pulled aside rather than lifted and the visor wasconsequently invisible from the bridge whether

open or closed. She had repeatedly sailed with bowand / or rear doors open and the captains had, to noavail, requested alarms or monitors.[8] Hertimetable was so tight, there was not sufficient timeto make ready for sea and her ballast pumps werenot adequate to trim her by stern prior to departure.She frequently carried far too many passengers,exceeding life saving equipment and certificates.Checking list was not being used.

A German group of experts working on behalf ofthe designers and the shipyard which constructedEstonia published a report prior to the officialreport because the German group of experts wasutterly alarmed by the official investigation.[11]The Swedish Naval Architect Anders Björkman,calls the official report a disaster-investigation andthe biggest fraud in maritime history at hiswebsite.[12] He seems to be far from proud of theSwedish civil service in this respect.

At the day of the disaster she completed loadingslightly behind schedule. She left harbor withforward trim due to final loading operations and

ballast was pumped to trim her on the stern. The boatswain in charge of the bow visor was on dutythough sleeping in his bed. Nobody noticed this andthe ship left harbor, her bow wide open, trimmed onthe bow and behind schedule. To catch up with theschedule the captain ordered extra power aheadwhen the ship sailed in shallow water. Thecombination of shallow water, forward trim andhigh speed created a huge bow wave and waterflowed rapidly into the garage. Presumably thecaptain did not have any tip-off until the shipshortly afterwards became instable.

The water trapped on the car deck started tooscillate thus causing the ship to roll from side toside after which she capsized. The shallow water

being partly causative to the water inflow nowsaved the ship from a roll over which presumablywould have killed everybody aboard.

Figure 10: The visor and ramp of MV Estonia

In their preliminary report JAIC pointed that theSwedish / Finish failure to respect internationalsafety agreement probably was causative to theincident becoming a disaster.[13] In order tolengthen the effective car deck, the requiredextension of the collision bulkhead had not beencarried out for ships registered in these countries.The ramp functioned as a barrier but it was locatedtoo far forward and did not represent the

redundancy expected. Consequently one may arguethat the dispensation from IMO rules granted byFinland and Sweden severely compromised one of

Monitoring systems were later installed on suchships and I have been told UK based Ro Ro Paxvessels are not allowed to carry passengers belowthe car deck and that such ships have to weight thecargo prior to loading in UK.

The investigation opened for criminalinvestigation.[9]



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the most vital ship survival principles.($3.1) If the bow were to fail, the garage would be wide open.The probability of such a scenario had been pre-warned the previous year when a Swedish ship withsimilar bow, damaged her visor in heavy weather.

The main problem with the highly criticized sinkingscenario of JAIC is that both visor and ramp had to be open for a considerable time to allow floodingsimilar to that of the Herald of Free Enterprisedisaster. However, the ramp, though slightlydamaged, was found closed when the wreck wasinspected. The official explanation was that theramp was forced open when the visor was knockedoff, then the ramp remained open for a while afterwhich it closed itself. The theory is quiteextraordinary and it is hard to imagine the loweredramp could sustain the forces as the shipencountered the impacts from wave after wave at

full speed. During that period, the ramp would only be supported by the hinges, and the closing deviceswhich were obviously not designed to handle otherforces than the gravity of the ramp itself. The storyabout the ramp is thoroughly contradicted byAnders Björkman and the German group of experts.

Figure 11: Sketch by engine crew [1]

Water was observed penetrating through openings beside the ramp from the engine control room and presumably the ship command witnessed the samevideo at the bridge. Simultaneously a passenger

noted the visor was moving up and down indicatingthat the void between visor and ramp was filled bywater under pulsating pressure. The German Groupof Experts further pointed out that the bow ofEstonia had been severely weakened when Estoniahad forced her way through ice rather than beingassisted by ice-breakers during the precedingwinter.

Anders Björkman has argued that the ship should be unsinkable if the hull below the garage wasundamaged and he has stressed that the ship wouldcapsize bottom up immediately if the ship became

instable due to water on cardeck. It seems likelythat the ship would have capsized immediately and

it is quite obvious she could not sink if the volume below the cardeck was un-flooded. Such floodingwould either be by hole in the hull or by staircasesand/or the ventilator-shafts which were positionedin the center plane of the ship.

The German group of experts stated, as a matter offact, that the ship had an underwater leakage aswater was up-flooding by the elevator shaft fromthe sauna located at deck one forward. AndersBjörkman launched a theory that the engine-roomwas flooded and that a stabilizer fin might have

been ripped of. Both of these theories werecontradicted, after the JAIC report was completed,

by former participants of the JAIC.[14]

Figure 12: Expected water flow

It is well known that the movement of water insidea tank may be phase delayed in proportion to themovement that causes it. Phase delay will probably

be particularly long for ships with center-casingswhich require water to flow around the center-casings. Consequently internal waves fromentrapped water may be in counter phase with themovement. One may expect that the internal wavesmight become very huge and able to dislocatecargo. Such ships are expected to withstand a

collision including two compartments but then thefreeboard from the punctured garage could be

perilously low. If such a damaged ship rolls and pitches due to bad weather, one may expect waterentering the hole to become trapped at the cardeck.Consequently one may not rule out that some of thedamage scenarios such ships were expected tosurvive might cause capsize due to wateraccumulation.

The Estonia disaster entailed a safety conferencewhere some states agreed to install closable barrierson the cardeck in addition to the extension of the

collision bulkhead. Such barriers would of course prevent huge amounts of water to be trapped in thegarage as the accumulation would be restricted to asmall region, the phase delay would be low and theout-flowing pressures would increase rapidly.

Anders Björkman highlighted that all watertightdoors in the passenger accommodation had to beopen aboard MV Estonia to give access to toilets.Furthermore it is common practice to keep doors inthe engine division open. Though such doors may

be remotely closed from the bridge, in a couple ofminutes, a lot of water might flood the undamaged

compartments prior to doors being closed. TheEmpress of Ireland demonstrated the problem when



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she sank in 14 minutes. A full impact of a modernship might very well make a much bigger hole thusinitial flow rate may be expected to be much faster.

A similar ship, built 5 years previous to Estonia,was sold by a Norwegian ship-owner in 2006. Theyroughly estimated such ships, when 30 years old, to

be priced at 10 to 20% of the value of new builds.A Ro-Ro pax, Al Salam Petrarca 90, which sank

outside Dhiba port in 2002, was later salvaged to bescrapped. Though the scrap value was higher at thattime than now, the Red Sea is closer to the scrapmarked, and the ship might have been consideredan navigational obstacle, one may still question ifsimilar salvage of MV Estonia might have madeeconomic sense?

Some argue these ships should have side-casingsrather than center-casings to allow water from the

garages to drain down the stairways as precautionto capsize. I doubt passengers like huge amounts ofwater to block their route of escape, thus these shipsshould, in my opinion, rather be equipped withstrong drainage systems by precautions.

Experience from the Skagerak accident in 1966suggests doors at cardeck should be watertight to

prevent down-flooding of the engine-room. TheQueen of the North accident suggests these doorsshould be watertight to prevent up-flooding whengrounding. Thus the garage would function as alife-belt for the ship in case of raking. Ships

constructed to comply with the StockholmConvention strengthened the doors from the garageto prevent down-flooding from partly filledgarages. The doors were however, not able towithstand up-flooding. For new builds this haschanged as they are required to have water locksseparating garage from volumes located below thegarage.

The Swedish Maritime Directorate concluded thatno private company would care to salvage the shipthough nobody could prevent them.[16] That may

be correct but Stolt Comex Seaway argued thatrapid rescuing of the bodies surrounding the wreck

was important as they otherwise might drift off.[17]Stolt Comex Seaway offered to perform a searchand rescue on a strictly cost based rate, but the offerwas rejected, and classified as secret by theSwedish Department of Commerce.

The Swedish Government decided not to bring upthe perished. This contrasts with the custom ofstates of comparable economic strength, to bringhome soldiers lost overseas at the time of thedisaster. In comparison tremendous efforts wasused after the tsunami 10 years later at search,rescue and identifying the perished. The

international community defined, on request ofSweden, the site of MV Estonia as a sea tomb. The130 bodies which had been observed by divers werenot brought home and search for the approximately600 who were not accounted for were not

performed. Furthermore, diving in the area as wellas salvage of the wreck became banned. When onelater learned that the Swedish Navy screened covertdiving operations shortly after the accident and that

parts of the video inspection of the hull has beenlost, some unrest by the public seems quiteunderstandable.

Estonia was originally sailing under Finish flag andtransferred to Estonia 1½ year before the disaster.When an Estonian / Swedish company bought theship and named her Estonia, the European Bank of

Reconstruction and Development required the shipto be registered in Cyprus to obtain a mortgageloan. The ship was, however, double registered inEstonia. How Cypriote authorities carried out theirmaritime duties is unknown though they seem tohave been absolutely absent during theinvestigation. Estonian authorities delegated theirmaritime duties to Bureau Veritas, who had beenthe classification society from the keel was laid.Estonian maritime authorities were at the time ofthe accident being trained by Swedish maritimeauthorities to comply with the Paris Memorandumof Understanding on Port State Control. During the

last day in Tallinn the trainees made a thoroughPort State Control inspection of the ESTONIA andwere supervised and instructed by two seniorinspectors from the Swedish MaritimeAdministration. The official report states: TheSwedish inspectors leading the exercise have been

interrogated by the Commission and have stated

that the vessel was in good condition and very well

maintained . Anders Björkman and the Germangroup of experts disagree in this regard and MrBjörkman stated, according to information he hadobtained, that one of the inspectors’ initial reactionswas to stop the ship and that the inspector contacted

the highest ranking Swedish authority in this regardshortly prior to departure.[15, $ 2.3]

5.3. AL SALAM BOCCACCIO 98Al Salam Boccaccio 98 capsized and sank in thered sea February 2006 and more than 1069 personslost their lives. Very few details have been

published but one may summarize the course ofevents:

1. Fire started at cardeck and firefighting bysprinkler system commenced.

2. The drainage system did not functionsatisfactorily and water accumulated onthe cardeck.

3. The captain ordered to stop the firefighting

due to drainage problem and grave list.4. The list increased and the ship was lost.



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Since Al Salam Boccaccio 98 sank very fast, ratherthan capsizing bottom up, questions similar to thoseregarding the sinking scenario of Estonia should beraised. It is noteworthy that the radio officer put onthe table, or passed information from others to the

captain, that one might open the pilot-door to drainoff the water.[18] This may indicate that marinersand others involved in the trade are not entirelycontent with the drainage systems. Surely, if the

pilot door of Al Salam Boccaccio 98, or any otherdoor to the garage,e was open at time of disaster,this could have contributed to the rapid sinking.

As the hull probably was undamaged at the time ofdisaster one should expect damage stability to have

been neither causative nor contributive. However, a

press release from the classification society, RINA,stirred my interest as the freeboard seemed to be fartoo low.[19] Al Salam Boccaccio were originallydesigned for a draft of 5.40m but obtained 5.56mafter construction. However, after the sponsons andthe 3 extra decks were fitted in 1991, draft was

increased to 5.80/5.90. As neither damage stabilitynor any other relevant stability calculations seem tohave been performed after this major redesign it isnot obvious the ship complied with all relevantregulations. Such calculus is of course of particularinterest as the ship was heightened rather thanelongated which is the normal way to increasecapacity. The reduced freeboard lowered dischargecapacity from the garage as pressure height wasreduced. Whether or not this was compensated byincreased pipe dimensioning is unknown.

Figure 13: Al Salam Boccaccio, [19]

A mere look at the drawing from the RINA pressrelease suggests a vertical hole including the garageand any one of the compartments below maycapsize / sink these ships rapidly. As the pressrelease repeatedly referred to an exemption rule andRINA has not documented the stability after themajor redesign, one may question if they mighthave exaggerated the elasticity of the exemptionrule in question.

The sponsons of Al Salam Boccaccio could have been extended upward to improve stability at high

angles and to increase time of rescue. Though suchextension might not improve statutory stability onemay argue that it could have been consideredcontributive, if the redesign was accepted due to anexemption rule.

When the ship was sold in 1999 and re-flagged inPanama, the cardeck at mid-height of the garagewas removed. If this deck previously were fixed,rather than hoistable, the removal increased the

capacity to carry lorries. Consequently the capacityfor overloading by draft, as well as stability,

probably increased as well.



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A sister-ship of Al Salam Boccaccio 98, Al SalamPetrarca 90, suffered a similar accident in 2002, offDhiba port, and one seafarer perished. Since thesame owners, flag state, harbor states, classificationsociety and P&I club seem to have been involved in

both of these cases one may question if prudentsteps were taken to prevent similar accident as theone in 2002?

Al Salam Boccaccio was originally designed forMediterranean trade under the Italian classificationsociety RINA’s supervision. It seems Italianauthorities delegated a lot of their responsibility toRINA and that RINA was their marine technicalsupervisor. When the ship changed to Panamanianflag this was done under RINA’s supervision and itseems Panama delegated their responsibilities toRINA much the same way Italy had done.

6. AUTOMATIC DETECTION AND

TRANSMISSION OF SHIP DATA

The loss of MV Server, in January 2007 outsideBergen, suggests real-time access to vital ship

parameters could help authorities to control coastaltraffic. The knowledge that such data is beingtransmitted and recorded might have sobering effecton captains twisting the rules.

Of more interest to this conference is automaticdetection of ship roll parameters, as these, in

combination with synchronous wind and wave parameters, may indicate whether or not ships havetoo low stability, or are treated too roughly. Suchdata could further be used to examine ships real-time behavior and risks and this may lead to bettertuning of stability criteria by authorities.

Figure 14: Finnbirch 01/11/06

The increased amount of light cargo beingtransported overseas may tempt captains to neglect

established stability criteria and the need for simpleand time-efficient GM-detection will increase.

Though I have not studied neither the accident ofthe Cougar Ace (a car vessel) nor the Finnbirch (acontainer vessel) which both capsized in heavyweather the autumn of 2006, I mention these shipsas examples of carriers of light cargo, and vesselsthat might need particular attention regarding roll

response.

At time of design the operational need for high CGmay be underestimated thus the ballast segregationmay be under dimensioned. Consequently one mayargue that the introduction of functionalisticregulations should be followed by improved GMcontrol by authorities. This was demonstrated quiteclearly in the Rocknes case. After her initialredesign she was expected to carry huge amounts of

ballast in loaded condition and one may very wellargue the ship was well designed for in-statutoryoperation.[20] Equipment to monitor and transmit

such data should be rather cheap to produce andeasy to operate. Consequently owners might findsuch equipment attractive, if insurance premiumreflects the improved quality control and safety.Furthermore, coastal states should considerrequiring such equipment for ro-ro pax as safety ofthese are of tremendous interest to the harbor states.

7. TIME DOMAIN SIMULATIONSFor years offshore operations have been dependanton time domain simulations to study variousoperations in advance. Ship design as well, could

probably be improved, if one has to demonstrate byuse of time domain simulations, that the design isfunctionalistic for its purpose. Furthermore, if theloading calculators were designed to handle timedomain simulations, ship command might analyzemost damage scenarios real time, and train onrealistic scenarios. Under all circumstances, shipcommand should have access to a set of timedomain simulations on video, to know their ships

better. Control authorities and decision makers aswell, might benefit from studies of videosdemonstrating reality.

8. CONCLUSIONIt seems that many disasters involving passengerships could and should have been avoided if theshipping industry, and authorities, had prudentlyensured such ships to comply with global ethicalstandards rather than unsatisfactory rules anddispensations. As long as such rules and theirenforcement continue to be unsatisfactory, incidentswill develop into full scale superfluous disastersand the loss of seafarers will carry on.

Improving safety by design may in many ways be a

good option. However, if the ships are not properlymaintained, and operated, even the best designed



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6. The Commission of Inquiry, Preliminaryinquiry into the grounding and evacuationof the high speed catamaran "Saint-Malo"off Corbiere point, Jersey 17. april 1995.

New Jersey, 1995.

ship will not be safe. In addition to control ofmaintenance, methods to control operation should

be improved.

The evolvement of functionalistic regulationsshould include the use of time domain simulation

for various conditions the ships are not expected tosurvive. Roll response should be studied to verify ifGM may be detected due to ships behaviour at sea.

7. Leirvik J. B. and G. Mjanger, HSD

Careless recording, NRK Hordaland. 2006.8. The Commission of Inquiry, The MerchantShipping Act 1894 : MV Herald of FreeEnterprise : report of court no. 8074:formal investigation”. . 1987, H.M.S.O.Since harbour-states rather than commerce and

flag-states carry the burden of the passenger shipaccidents, harbour-states or regions of such shoulddemand a more precautionary and vigilant role. Asall the examples used in this article have its originin European shipping-culture I welcome the newlyappointed European Maritime Safety Agency andstrongly support their goal:

9. Zeebrugge disaster was no accident. 1987,BBC.

10. Utvik Senior compensation andgovernmental expenditure, in TromsFolkeblad. 2005: Troms.

11. Holtappels, P. and W.Hummel, 1stInvestigation report on the capsizing on 28September in the Baltic Sea of the Ro-Ro

Passenger vessel MV Estonia. 1997.Swedish.http://www.hib.no/ansatte/rci/Estonia/G_R eport_1.pdf

European citizens have the right to expecttheir maritime passenger and goods

transport to be safe, secure and clean.[21]

These matters will be discussed in depth in myunpublished essay; “The Ethics of European Ship

Designs’”.

12. Björkman, A., Disaster Investigation, The biggest Fraud in maritime History.http://heiwaco.tripod.com/ekatastrofkurs.htm

13. Joint Accident Investigation Commission,Preliminary Technical report on the MVESTONIA disaster of 28 September 19941996, Estonia.

9. AUTHORS’ BIOGRAPHIES

Rolf C. Imstøl holds the current position ofassistant professor at Bergen University College.

He is responsible for lecturing of Mathematics andScience at Institute of Mechanical and Marine-Technical Engineering and he guide students doingtheir theses in the field of hydrostatic stability.Additionally he acts as marine technical & nauticalconsultant for solicitors working on behalf of many

bereaved and some survivors in the Al SalamBoccaccio 98 and Rocknes cases. He has previously

published a set of articles regarding the Rocknescapsize.

14. Karpinnen, T., M.Huss, and K. Rahka,

Estonia: Hard Facts and realities. The Naval Architect, 1998. Sept 98.

15. Björkman, A., New fact regarding Estoni-Report regarding the explanation. 1999.Swedish.

16. The Swedish Maritime Directorate, Reportregarding the technical and legalconditions to find and rescue the bodiesfrom Estonia. 1994. Swedish.http://www.hib.no/ansatte/RCI/Estonia/resque.pdf

17. Stenquist, A. 1994, Stolt Comex Seaway. Norwegian.

http://www.hib.no/ansatte/RCI/Estonia/SCS.pdf

10. REFERENCES:

1.

Joint Accident Investigation Commission,Final report on the MV ESTONIA disasterof 28 September 1994, The Government ofthe Republic of Estonia. 1997

18. Black box transcript reveals four hours ofconfusion and fear as ferry sank. Lloyd'sList, 24 April 2006.2. James Brewer, A peaceful year with fewer

disasters creates goodwill among insurers,Lloyd's List. 21 December 2006

19. Press Release, MV Al Salam Boccaccio98, #3 2006, RINAhttp://www.rina.org/UploadedFiles/boccaccio_update3.PDF

3. The Commission of Inquiry, TheScandinavian Star accident, 7th of April1990. NOU. 1991. 20. Rolf Imstøl, TU.no Articles regarding the

Rocknes Disaster. Norwegian TechnicalReview, 2005.http://www.tu.no/multimedia/archive/0002

7/The_capsize_of_MV_Ro_27082a.pdf

4. The Commission of Inquiry, The High-Speed Craft MS Sleipner Disaster 26

November 1999, $3.2.1. 2000, NOU.

5.

Fared horror scenario, in Bergens Avisen.1985: Bergen. 21. EMSA, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/


http://www.hib.no/ansatte/rci/Estonia/G_Report_1.pdfhttp://www.hib.no/ansatte/rci/Estonia/G_Report_1.pdfhttp://heiwaco.tripod.com/ekatastrofkurs.htmhttp://heiwaco.tripod.com/ekatastrofkurs.htmhttp://www.hib.no/ansatte/RCI/Estonia/resque.pdfhttp://www.hib.no/ansatte/RCI/Estonia/resque.pdfhttp://www.hib.no/ansatte/RCI/Estonia/SCS.pdfhttp://www.hib.no/ansatte/RCI/Estonia/SCS.pdfhttp://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/viewArticle.htm?articleId=1166547175013&highlight=true&keywords=al+salam++http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/viewArticle.htm?articleId=1166547175013&highlight=true&keywords=al+salam++http://www.rina.org/UploadedFiles/boccaccio_update3.PDFhttp://www.rina.org/UploadedFiles/boccaccio_update3.PDFhttp://www.tu.no/multimedia/archive/00027/The_capsize_of_MV_Ro_27082a.pdfhttp://www.tu.no/multimedia/archive/00027/The_capsize_of_MV_Ro_27082a.pdfhttp://www.emsa.europa.eu/http://www.emsa.europa.eu/http://www.tu.no/multimedia/archive/00027/The_capsize_of_MV_Ro_27082a.pdfhttp://www.tu.no/multimedia/archive/00027/The_capsize_of_MV_Ro_27082a.pdfhttp://www.rina.org/UploadedFiles/boccaccio_update3.PDFhttp://www.rina.org/UploadedFiles/boccaccio_update3.PDFhttp://www.hib.no/ansatte/RCI/Estonia/SCS.pdfhttp://www.hib.no/ansatte/RCI/Estonia/SCS.pdfhttp://www.hib.no/ansatte/RCI/Estonia/resque.pdfhttp://www.hib.no/ansatte/RCI/Estonia/resque.pdfhttp://heiwaco.tripod.com/ekatastrofkurs.htmhttp://heiwaco.tripod.com/ekatastrofkurs.htmhttp://www.hib.no/ansatte/rci/Estonia/G_Report_1.pdfhttp://www.hib.no/ansatte/rci/Estonia/G_Report_1.pdfhttp://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/viewArticle.htm?articleId=1166547175013&highlight=true&keywords=al+salam++http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/viewArticle.htm?articleId=1166547175013&highlight=true&keywords=al+salam++


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