18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z��
�%�
E��ƲL�
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 1 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z��
�SN
1 ªÏ÷*²LÆ
2 �Ïý��å
3 �¤²wÂÃ
4 k�Ý]ÂÃ
5 ºx©ÑÂÃ
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 2 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 1. ªÏ÷*²LÆ
÷*²LÀÂ
I[o´¡��«ÀÂ"XJ;�î�g,/³§3µ4²L^�e§
<��U�Ì�~�¤!|�)�gͧ�3m�²L^�e§K�±ÏLI
S/�Ú�Ï5ÝL�Å"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 3 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 1. ªÏ÷*²LÆ
ªÏ÷*²LÆ
Intertemporal choices 1 require decision-makers to trade-off costs and
benefits at different points in time. These decisions may be about
savings, work effort, education, nutrition, exercise, health care and so
forth.
3m�÷*²LÆ¥§·�^ªÏ£interpemporal¤½Ä�
£dynamic¤©Û��{§ïÄ�«ÀÂé��I[²~âr!I
ãL!®ÇY²Ú�Ñ�÷*²LCþ�K�"
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intertemporal choice
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 4 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 2. �Ïý��å
�Ïý��å
�,3m�²L^�e§��I[�±ÏLIS/�éÀÂ?1�
À§�K]Ú/�7LÉ��Ïý��å£long-run budget
constraint, LRBC¤���"
Ä��.b½µ
�.m�²L£small open economy¤µ�I´.¢S|Çr∗��
Éö§û¬½|Ú7K½|��m�§d����5"
ü>=£Ú]�âr{��""
NUT = KA = 0, CA = TB + NFIA
ÏÐÜãL�W§Ø�3ÜãL�]�ÂÃ"
VAL = 0, ∆W = CA
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 5 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 2. �Ïý��å
�Ïý��åµí�
d�âÜãLCz�úªkµ
∆WT = CAT = TBT︸︷︷︸Trade balancethis period
+ r∗WT−1︸ ︷︷ ︸Interest paid/received
on last period′s external wealth
WT︸︷︷︸External wealth atthe end of this period
= TBT︸︷︷︸Trade balancethis period
+ (1 + r∗)WT−1︸ ︷︷ ︸Last period′s external wealthplus interest paid/received
^4í�{���Ïý��å£LRBC¤^�µ
WT =WT+1 − TBT+1
1 + r∗=
WT+2 − TBT+2
(1 + r∗)2− TBT+1
1 + r∗= ...
−WT︸ ︷︷ ︸minus present wealth
=∞∑s=1
TBT+s
(1 + r∗)s︸ ︷︷ ︸Present value of future trade balances
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 6 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 2. �Ïý��å
�Ïý��åµ¹Â
−WT =∞∑s=1
TBT+s
(1 + r∗)s⇔WT +
∞∑s=1
GDPT+s
(1 + r∗)s=∞∑s=1
GNET+s
(1 + r∗)s
LRBC^�¿�Xµ
��I[XJ�ÏéãL�K£=éKŤ§�5,��ÏT
I7L¼�n´{�^�5���ÏÅÖ"
��I[�5IS|Ñ�oy��uTI�ÏéãLÚ�5IS
)�o��oy�§=oÂ\7L�uo|Ñ"
3m�²L^�e§��I[7L�±n´»i£½J{¤�é
ãL�m�²ï§/þ\�Ñ0´�Ïý��å���"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 7 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 2. �Ïý��å
�Ïý��åµ{I´�~íº
g20V80c�¥Ï±5§{I©ª´ÀÅÖI£=ÜãLW < 0¤§
1990c�±5KÑyã��!Øä*��²~�8»i§J�{IØ
ÉLRBC^���åíº
ÚOêâw«{I3¤�ÀÅÖI�Ó�%U¼���À��Â\§'�
3uÙ¼��]�|Ç'|G�ÅÖ|Ç�pr∗ > r§±�u
¦r∗A− rL > 0"@320V60c�{IÒ��{IPkLÝ�A�
£Exorbitant Privilege¤§={I|^$EIÅé/±§Ó�ÏLFDIÚ
é�¦Ý]¼��pÂÃ"$/p��E�£²þ�1.5%*2%¤¿�
X{I�k/.Õ10�A�"
Ó�{I�Ï�ÉÙÜãL��XÚ5�]�ÂÃKG > 0§k²LÆ
[¡��5gU,�[³£Manna from Heaven¤"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 8 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 2. �Ïý��å
�Ïý��åµ{I´�~íº£Y¤
∆WT = CAT + VALT = TBT + r∗AT−1 − rLT−1 + KGT
= TBT + r∗WT−1︸ ︷︷ ︸Conventional effects
+ (r∗ − r) LT−1 + KGT︸ ︷︷ ︸Additional effects
ü���A£|�Â\Ú]
�|�¤Ü©-�{I�ã
L��§¦��²LÆ[é
{I*Ü�n´»ik�
�°N�w{"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 9 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 3. �¤²wÂÃ
�¤²wÂõvkÀÂ�µ4²L
y3·��Ä��m�²LXÛ$^Ü/�5�Ø�¤ÅÄ�ºx"
b½��I[�ЩãLW−1 = 0§.¢S|Çr∗ = 5%§Ø�
Äè�Ý]Ú�?|ÑI = G = 0"
µ4²L^�e£TB = 0¤§TI�Ï��ÑÚ�¤þ�100ü µ
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 10 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 3. �¤²wÂÃ
�¤²wÂõk6�5ÀÂ�µ4²L
b½TI310Ï;É��K¡À§�Ñeü21�ü "
3µ4²L£closed economy¤^�e§TB = 0, Q = C§Ïd
10Ï��¤�ò��eü21�ü "�Ñ�CÄòÚå�¤��
þCÄ∆Q = ∆C"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 11 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 3. �¤²wÂÃ
�¤²wÂõk6�5ÀÂ�m�²L
m�²L£open economy¤^�eTB 6= 0, Q 6= C§TI�±3÷
vLRBC^��Ó�§ÏLIS/�5²w�¤!JpI¬4|"
−WT =∞∑s=1
QT+s−CT+s
(1+r∗)s= 0⇒ 79
1+r∗ + 100(1+r∗)2
+ 100(1+r∗)3
... = Cr∗
⇒ C = 100− 21× 0.05/1.05 = 99
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 12 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 3. �¤²wÂÃ
�¤²wÂõk[È5ÀÂ�m�²L
XJÀ´[È5�§ØØTI²L´Äm�§3LRBC^���
åe§TIÑ�U�þ/N��¤∆Q = ∆C"
�(ص
��I[UÏLIS/�5�Ø6�5À§�7LN��¤±
·A[È5ÀÂ"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 13 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 3. �¤²wÂÃ
�¤²wÂÃ�{¤Y~µ�Ô�K]
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 14 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 3. �¤²wÂÃ
�¤²wÂÃ�ªI'�µ7Km�Ý��¤²w
�,3nØþ§��I[�±ÏL7Km�5²w�¤§�é170�
I[1995*2004c�êâïÄL²§7Km�I�������p�§
ݧ�¤ÅÄâ¬$u�ÑÅÄ"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 15 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 4. k�Ý]ÂÃ
k�Ý]Âõµ4²L
y3�Ä��m�²LXÛ3²w�¤�Ó�§¼����Ý]ÂÃ"
Eb½��I[�ЩãLW−1 = 0§.¢S|Çr∗ = 5%§Ø
�Ä�?|ÑG = 0"
b�10c?1�Ý]I�16ü �|ѧ�d�zcò¬¼
�105ü �o�Ñ"
µ4²L^�e§�¤Ý]¬¦�¤�)é��ÅÄ"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 16 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 4. k�Ý]ÂÃ
k�Ý]Âõm�²L
m�²L^�e§�I�±3�¤²w��¹e�¤Ý]"
−WT =∞∑s=1
QT+s − CT+s − IT+s
(1 + r∗)s= 0⇒ 100
1 + r∗+
105
(1 + r∗)2+ ...− 16
1 + r∗=
C
r∗
⇒ C = 105− 21× 0.05
1.05= 104
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 17 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 4. k�Ý]ÂÃ
IS½|�Nzµé%�h�J�~f
20V60c�uy�°�h��§AO´70c�1�g�h�Å�§é%
m©�5�mu�°�h"�é%¤kÝ]�áÏO�ÑdI]�Jø§�
Ü©´ªI�húi"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 18 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 4. k�Ý]ÂÃ
IS½|�NzµÄuu�I[êâ�u�
XJIS½|´pÝ�Nz�§.�I�Ý]I¦�±ØÉ�I;O�
¹��å§�I;OÇØK��IÝ]Ç"
ÏdXJ£8eã�§§A
TÃ{áý β̂ = 0 �"b�µ
(I/Y )i = α + β(S/Y )i + εi
Feldstein and Horioka£1980¤
�ïÄáýþãß�"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 19 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 4. k�Ý]ÂÃ
IS½|�Nzµ¡IUÄl¥Éú
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 20 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 4. k�Ý]ÂÃ
©kd��µ��o]�ØlLI6�¡Iº
The Lucas paradox was put forward in his widely cited 1990 article Why
Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?.
The theoretical explanations2 can be grouped into two categories.
The first group attributes the limited amount of capital received by poorer
nations to differences in fundamentals that affect the production structure of
the economy, such as technological differences, missing factors of production,
government policies, and the institutional structure.
The second group of explanations focuses on international capital market
imperfections, mainly sovereign risk (risk of nationalization) and asymmetric
information. Although the expected return on investment might be high in
many developing countries, it does not flow there because of the high level of
uncertainty associated with those expected returns.
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucas paradox
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 21 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 4. k�Ý]ÂÃ
)�©kd��µ£1¤)�åY²��É
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 22 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 4. k�Ý]ÂÃ
)�åY²�²L�¥z¥�ÂÃ
)�åY²´��I[�Eâ�ÇÚ�¬�Ç�nÜ�N"uÐ¥I[�
kJpg��)�åY²âUl²L�¥z¥¼����ÂÃ"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 23 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 4. k�Ý]ÂÃ
)�©kd��µ£2¤Ì�ºxÄd��É
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 24 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 5. ºx©ÑÂÃ
7KÝ]��¥z
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 25 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 5. ºx©ÑÂÃ
ü�I[¡��é¡5�ÑÀÂ�«~
�Ä3m�²L^�e§XÛÏL7KÝ]5©úºx!²w�¤"
b½kAÚBü�I[§oÂ\�u]�Â\ÚNÄÂ\�Ú¶
b½üI¡��é¡5�ÑÀ§=üI�Ñ¥yÑ���K�'5£�
'Xê�−1¤"äNb½ü«�ÑG�1Ú2±��50%�VÇÑy§G
�1�AI�Ñ�$!BI�p§G�2�fÐ��"
µ4²L^�eüIvkéÝ]§�¤ò�Â\Ñy�ÌÅÄ"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 26 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 5. ºx©ÑÂÃ
ÏL7KÝ]ü$Â\Ú�¤�ÅÄ5
XJüIÏL7KÝ]§©O±ké�]���°��50%§¿¼��A
'~�]�Â\§K�±k�ü$Â\Ú�¤�ÅÄ5"
üI¡��é¡5�ÑÀÂ�§ÏL±ké�]�100%�°�§�±?
�Úü$Â\Ú�¤�ÅÄ5"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 27 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 5. ºx©ÑÂÃ
�I ��
Lewis£1999¤�ïÄL²§{IÝ]ö�r8%���3I]�þ
£B:¤§ XJrÝ]�N��C:§{IÝ]ö���±3¼��pÝ]
ÂÃ�Ó�«ú���ºx"ù�y��¡�ISÝ]ö��I УHome
bias¤"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 28 / 29
18ù ISÂ| Iµ7K�¥z�� 5. ºx©ÑÂÃ
7KÝ]©Ñºx���
�,²L�m�U¦��I[��[Ì��§�l/Ø�r¤k/��3
Ó��;fp0��K?1õ�zÝ]§�7KÝ]��¥z ¬É�Ãõ
��µ
Â\5 µduNÄ���¤k�ØU�]�½7Kã�@��Ü{�
´§ÏdÏL]�Ú7Kâr?1�Ý]�U©ÑÜ© ��ܺx"
ºx5�µXJü�I[¡�é¡5�ÑÀ£=üI��ÑÀÂ���
�'§�'Xê�u+1¤§KÃ{ÏL7KÝ]5©Ñºx"
�ÝæNµ~Xdu�£Ú7K+���¡��ϧ¥I!�Ûd�I[
�Ì�ãLÄ73{I�°½|?1�Ý]Ò²~��««��ÚZ
ý"
�%� (E��ƲLÆ�) 18ù ISÂ| I 29 / 29
Top Related